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THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF NAGASAKI (Nagasaki, Japan, August 9, 1945)
Events
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Dawn of the Atomic Era, 1945
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The War Enters Its Final Phase, 1945
-
Debate Over How to Use the Bomb, Late Spring
1945
-
The Trinity Test, July 16, 1945
-
Safety and the Trinity Test, July 1945
-
Evaluations of Trinity, July 1945
-
Potsdam and the Final Decision to Bomb, July
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6,
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9,
1945
-
Japan Surrenders, August 10-15, 1945
-
The Manhattan Project and the Second World War,
1939-1945
The next break in the weather over Japan was due to appear
just three days after the
attack on Hiroshima, to be followed by at
least five more days of prohibitive weather. The
plutonium implosion bomb, nicknamed
"Fat Man," was rushed into readiness to take
advantage of this window. No further orders were
required for the attack.
Truman's order of July 25th had
authorized the dropping of additional bombs as soon as
they were ready. At 3:47 a.m. on August 9, 1945, a
B-29 named Bock's Car lifted off from Tinian and
headed toward the primary target: Kokura Arsenal, a
massive collection of war industries adjacent to the city
of Kokura.
From this point on, few things went according to
plan. The aircraft commander, Major Charles W.
Sweeney, ordered the arming of the bomb only ten minutes
after take-off so that the aircraft could be pressurized
and climb above the lightning and squalls that menaced the
flight all the way to Japan. (A journalist, William
L. Laurence of the New York Times, on an
escorting aircraft saw some "St. Elmo's fire"
glowing on the edges of the aircraft and worried that the
static electricity might detonate the bomb.) Sweeney
then discovered that due to a minor malfunction he would
not be able to access his reserve fuel. The aircraft
next had to orbit over Yaku-shima off the south coast of
Japan for almost an hour in order to rendezvous with its
two escort B-29s, one of which never did arrive. The
weather had been reported satisfactory earlier in the day
over Kokura Arsenal, but by the time the B-29 finally
arrived there, the target was obscured by smoke and
haze. Two more passes over the target still produced
no sightings of the aiming point. As an aircraft
crewman, Jacob Beser, later recalled, Japanese fighters
and bursts of antiaircraft fire were by this time starting
to make things "a little hairy." Kokura no
longer appeared to be an option, and there was only enough
fuel on board to return to the secondary airfield on
Okinawa, making one hurried pass as they went over their
secondary target, the
city of Nagasaki. As Beser later
put it, "there was no sense dragging the bomb home or
dropping it in the ocean."
As it turned out, cloud cover obscured Nagasaki as
well. Sweeney reluctantly approved a much less
accurate radar approach on the target. At the last
moment the bombardier, Captain Kermit K. Beahan, caught a
brief glimpse of the city's stadium through the clouds and
dropped the bomb. At 11:02 a.m., at an altitude of
1,650 feet, Fat Man (right) exploded over
Nagasaki. The yield of the
explosion was later estimated at 21 kilotons, 40 percent
greater than that of the
Hiroshima bomb.
Nagasaki was an industrial center and major port on the
western coast of Kyushu. As had happened at
Hiroshima, the "all-clear" from an early morning
air raid alert had long been given by the time the B-29
had begun its bombing run. A small conventional raid
on Nagasaki on August 1st had resulted in a partial
evacuation of the city, especially of school
children. There were still almost 200,000 people in
the city below the bomb when it exploded. The
hurriedly-targeted weapon ended up detonating almost
exactly between two of the principal targets in the city,
the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works to the south, and the
Mitsubishi-Urakami Torpedo Works (left) to the
north. Had the bomb exploded farther south the
residential and commercial heart of the city would have
suffered much greater damage.
In general, though Fat Man exploded with greater force
than Little Boy, the damage at Nagasaki was not as great
as it had been at Hiroshima. The hills of Nagasaki,
its geographic layout, and the bomb's detonation over an
industrial area all helped shield portions of the city
from the weapon's blast,
heat, and
radiation effects. The explosion
affected a total area of approximately 43 square
miles. About 8.5 of those square miles were water,
and 33 more square miles were only partially
settled. Many roads and rail lines escaped major
damage. In some areas electricity was not knocked
out, and fire breaks created over the last several months
helped to prevent the spread of fires to the
south.
Although the destruction at Nagasaki has generally
received less worldwide attention than that at Hiroshima,
it was extensive nonetheless. Almost everything up
to half a mile from ground zero was completely destroyed,
including even the earthquake-hardened concrete structures
that had sometimes survived at comparable distances at
Hiroshima. According to a Nagasaki Prefectural
report "men and animals died almost instantly"
within 1 kilometer (0.62 miles) of the point of
detonation. Almost all homes within a mile and a
half were destroyed, and dry, combustible materials such
as paper instantly burst into flames as far away as 10,000
feet from ground zero. Of the 52,000 homes in
Nagasaki, 14,000 were destroyed and 5,400 more seriously
damaged. Only 12 percent of the homes escaped
unscathed. The official Manhattan Engineer District
report on the attack termed the damage to the two
Mitsubishi plants "spectacular." Despite
the absence of a firestorm, numerous secondary fires
erupted throughout the city. Fire-fighting efforts
were hampered by water line breaks, and six weeks later
the city was still suffering from a shortage of
water. A U.S. Navy officer who visited the city in
mid-September reported that, even over a month after the
attack, "a smell of death and corruption pervades the
place." As at Hiroshima, the psychological
effects of the attack were undoubtedly
considerable.
As with the estimates of deaths at Hiroshima, it will
never be known for certain how many people died as a
result of the atomic attack on Nagasaki. The best
estimate is 40,000 people died initially, with 60,000 more
injured. By January 1946, the number of deaths
probably approached 70,000, with perhaps ultimately twice
that number dead total within five years. For those
areas of Nagasaki affected by the explosion, the death
rate was comparable to that at Hiroshima.
The day after the attack on Nagasaki, the emperor of Japan
overruled the military leaders of Japan and forced them to
offer to
surrender (almost) unconditionally.
-
The War Enters Its Final Phase, 1945
-
Debate Over How to Use the Bomb, Late Spring
1945
-
The Trinity Test, July 16, 1945
-
Safety and the Trinity Test, July 1945
-
Evaluations of Trinity, July 1945
-
Potsdam and the Final Decision to Bomb, July
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6,
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9,
1945
-
Japan Surrenders, August 10-15, 1945
-
The Manhattan Project and the Second World War,
1939-1945
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Sources and notes for this page.
Portions of the text for this page were adapted from,
and portions were taken directly from the
Office of History and Heritage Resources
publication:
F. G. Gosling,
The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb
(DOE/MA-0001; Washington: History Division, Department
of Energy, January 1999), 53-54. Also used was the report on "The
Atomic Bombings of
Hiroshima
and Nagasaki" in the official
Manhattan District History, produced by the War
Department in 1947 at the direction of
Leslie Groves, especially pages 1-19;
the "Atomic Bombings" document is available in
the University Publications of America (UPA) microfilm
collection,
Manhattan Project: Official History and Documents
(Washington: 1977), reel #1/12; the report itself is a
government document. For an account of the
mission, see the "Eye Witness Account: Atomic Bomb
Mission Over Nagasaki" press release, written by
William L. Laurence of the New York Times and
released on September 9, 1945; this is also available on
reel #1/12 of the UPA
Manhattan Project microfilm collection.
Summaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki casualty rates and
damage estimates appear in Leslie R. Groves,
Now It Can Be Told (New York: Harper & Row,
1962), 319, 329-330, 346, and Vincent C. Jones,
Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1988),
545-548. For a description of Kokura Arsenal and
interesting reflections on its postwar fate, see
"Chapter 4: Kokura" of Paul Saffo's essay
"The Road from Trinity: Reflections on the Atom
Bomb"; this is available on Paul Saffo's web site
at
http://www.saffo.com/essays/the-road-from-trinity-reflections-on-the-atom-bomb/. The map showing the flight paths for the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions is reproduced from
Gosling, Making the Atomic Bomb, 52. The
photographs of Fat Man and of the general devastation at
Nagasaki are courtesy the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(via the
National Archives (NARA)). The photograph of the destruction at the
Mitsubishi facility north of ground zero is courtesy the
Los Alamos National Laboratory; the photograph was taken by Robert Serber and is
reprinted in Rachel Fermi and Esther Samra,
Picturing the Bomb: Photographs from the Secret World
of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers, 1995),
190. The photograph of the mother and child is
courtesy the
Department of Energy
(via NARA). The photograph of the bodies in the
trench is reprinted from Vincent C. Jones,
Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 548.
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