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SAFETY
AND THE TRINITY TEST
(Trinity Test Site, July 1945)
Events >
Dawn of the Atomic Era, 1945
- The War Enters Its Final
Phase, 1945
- Debate Over How to Use the
Bomb, Late Spring 1945
- The Trinity Test, July 16,
1945
- Safety and the
Trinity Test, July 1945
- Evaluations of
Trinity, July 1945
- Potsdam and the
Final Decision to Bomb, July 1945
- The Atomic Bombing of
Hiroshima, August 6, 1945
- The Atomic Bombing of
Nagasaki, August 9, 1945
- Japan Surrenders, August
10-15, 1945
- The Manhattan Project and
the Second World War, 1939-1945
The "Trinity" atomic test
was the most violent man–made explosion in history to that date.
It also
posed the single most significant safety hazard of the entire Manhattan
Project.
Understanding this, test planners chose a flat,
desert
scrub region in the northwest corner of the isolated Alamogordo
Bombing
Range in south central New Mexico for the test. This location,
210 miles
south of Los Alamos, was only twenty
miles from the nearest
offsite habitation. If the
explosion was considerably larger than predicted, the dangers could be
extreme to the test personnel and surrounding areas.
During
the test, scientists, workers, and other observers were
withdrawn almost six miles and sheltered behind barricades. Leslie
Groves and Robert
Oppenheimer watched the test from two different sites so that
if one was killed in an
accident the other might survive to direct continued efforts. Los
Alamos scientists had even discussed
the possibility that the atmosphere itself might be ignited and the
entire earth
annihilated but dismissed this as an unlikely possibility.
Dangers from blast,
fragments, heat, and light, once
one was sufficiently removed
from ground zero,
evoked little concern. The real concern, barring a catastrophic
underestimation of the size of the blast, was with radiation.
Prior to
Trinity, scientists were well aware that the blast
would create potential radiation hazards. After all, even basic
laboratory or factory work created significant radiation safety issues. In the
case of an explosion, plutonium in the device would fission into other
radionuclides. Neutrons would
strike various elements on the
ground and turn some into radioactive isotopes. This radioactive
debris would be swept with fission products into a growing fireball
and lifted high into the air. Once in the atmosphere, a cloud of
intense radioactivity would form. Immediate radiation from the
explosion and residual
radioactive debris initially caused little concern because of dilution
in the air
and the isolation of the site, but as the test drew closer planners
realized,
with some sense of urgency, that radioactive
fallout over local
towns posed a
real hazard. Groves, in particular, feared legal culpability if
things got
out of hand. As a result, Army intelligence agents located and
mapped
everyone within a forty–mile radius. Test planners set up an
elaborate
offsite monitoring system and prepared evacuation plans if exposure
levels became too high.
The
test was more efficient than expected, and little fallout
initially dropped on the test site beyond 1,200 yards of ground
zero. Most
radioactivity was contained within the dense white mushroom cloud
that topped
out at 25,000 feet. Within an hour, the cloud had largely
dispersed toward
the north-northeast, all the while dropping a trail of fission
products.
Offsite fallout was heavy. Several ranch families, missed by the
Army
survey, received significant exposures in the two weeks following
Trinity.
The families, nonetheless, evidenced little external injury.
Livestock
were not as fortunate, suffering skin burns, bleeding, and loss of
hair.
Stafford Warren (right), the Manhattan District's chief medical
officer, reported to
Groves that "while no house area investigated received a dangerous
amount,
the dust outfall from the various portions of the cloud was potentially
a very
dangerous hazard over a band almost 30 miles wide extending almost 90
miles
northeast of the site." The Alamogordo site, Warren concluded,
was
"too small for a repetition of a similar test of this magnitude except
under very special conditions." For any future test, he proposed
finding a larger site, "preferably with a radius of at least 150 miles
without population." The Trinity test had been, as Warren informed
Groves, something of a near thing.
- The War Enters Its Final
Phase, 1945
- Debate Over How to Use the
Bomb, Late Spring 1945
- The Trinity Test, July 16,
1945
- Safety and the
Trinity Test, July 1945
- Evaluations of
Trinity, July 1945
- Potsdam and the
Final Decision to Bomb, July 1945
- The Atomic Bombing of
Hiroshima, August 6, 1945
- The Atomic Bombing of
Nagasaki, August 9, 1945
- Japan Surrenders, August
10-15, 1945
- The Manhattan Project and
the Second World War, 1939-1945
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Sources and notes for this page.
The text for this page was adapted from,
and portions were taken directly from the Office of History and
Heritage Resources publication: Terrence
R. Fehner and F. G. Gosling, Origins of the Nevada Test Site
(DOE/MA-0518; Washington: History Division, Department of Energy,
December 2000), 30-33. See also Barton C. Hacker, The
Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 75-78, 84-86,
89-93, 98-108. The photographs of the radiation safety team, the
bunker at S-10,000, and the tank Enrico
Fermi used to roll up on ground zero soon after the test are
all courtesy the Los Alamos National
Laboratory. The map of the Trinity Test Site is
reproduced from Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the
Atomic Bomb, United States Army in World War II (Washington: Center
of Military History, United States Army, 1988), 479. The
photograph of Stafford Warren is reprinted in Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan:
The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United States Army in World War II
(Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), 414.
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