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SAFETY AND THE TRINITY TEST (Trinity Test Site, July 1945)
Events
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Dawn of the Atomic Era, 1945
-
The War Enters Its Final Phase, 1945
-
Debate Over How to Use the Bomb, Late Spring
1945
-
The Trinity Test, July 16, 1945
-
Safety and the Trinity Test, July 1945
-
Evaluations of Trinity, July 1945
-
Potsdam and the Final Decision to Bomb, July
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6,
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9,
1945
-
Japan Surrenders, August 10-15, 1945
-
The Manhattan Project and the Second World War,
1939-1945
The "Trinity" atomic test
was the most violent man–made explosion in history
to that date. It also posed the single most
significant safety hazard of the entire Manhattan
Project. Understanding this, test planners chose a
flat, desert scrub region in the
northwest corner of the isolated Alamogordo Bombing Range
in south central New Mexico for the test. This
location, 210 miles south of Los Alamos,
was only twenty miles from the nearest offsite
habitation. If the explosion was considerably larger
than predicted, the dangers could be extreme to the test
personnel and surrounding areas.
During the test, scientists, workers, and other observers
were withdrawn almost six miles and sheltered behind
barricades. Leslie Groves and
Robert Oppenheimer watched the test from
two different sites so that if one was killed in an
accident the other might survive to direct continued
efforts. Los Alamos scientists had even discussed
the possibility that the atmosphere itself might be
ignited and the entire earth annihilated but dismissed
this as an unlikely possibility. Dangers from
blast, fragments, heat,
and light, once one was sufficiently removed from ground
zero, evoked little concern. The real concern,
barring a catastrophic underestimation of the size of the
blast, was with radiation.
Prior to Trinity, scientists were well aware that the
blast would create potential radiation hazards.
After all, even basic laboratory or factory work created
significant
radiation safety issues. In the
case of an explosion, plutonium in the device would
fission into other radionuclides.
Neutrons would strike various elements on
the ground and turn some into radioactive isotopes.
This radioactive debris would be swept with fission
products into a growing fireball and
lifted high into the air. Once in the atmosphere, a
cloud of intense radioactivity would form. Immediate
radiation from the explosion and residual radioactive
debris initially caused little concern because of dilution
in the air and the isolation of the site, but as the test
drew closer planners realized, with some sense of urgency,
that radioactive fallout over local towns
posed a real hazard. Groves, in particular, feared
legal culpability if things got out of hand. As a
result, Army intelligence agents located and mapped
everyone within a forty–mile radius. Test
planners set up an elaborate offsite monitoring system and
prepared evacuation plans if exposure levels became too
high.
The test was more efficient than expected, and little
fallout initially dropped on the test site beyond 1,200
yards of ground zero. Most radioactivity was
contained within the dense white mushroom cloud that
topped out at 25,000 feet. Within an hour, the cloud
had largely dispersed toward the north-northeast, all the
while dropping a trail of fission products. Offsite
fallout was heavy. Several ranch families, missed by
the Army survey, received significant exposures in the two
weeks following Trinity. The families, nonetheless,
evidenced little external injury. Livestock were not
as fortunate, suffering skin burns, bleeding, and loss of
hair. Stafford Warren (right), the Manhattan
District's chief medical officer, reported to Groves that
"while no house area investigated received a dangerous
amount, the dust outfall from the various portions of the
cloud was potentially a very dangerous hazard over a band
almost 30 miles wide extending almost 90 miles northeast
of the site." The Alamogordo site, Warren concluded,
was "too small for a repetition of a similar test of this
magnitude except under very special conditions." For
any future test, he proposed finding a larger site,
"preferably with a radius of at least 150 miles without
population." The Trinity test had been, as Warren informed
Groves, something of a near thing.
-
The War Enters Its Final Phase, 1945
-
Debate Over How to Use the Bomb, Late Spring
1945
-
The Trinity Test, July 16, 1945
-
Safety and the Trinity Test, July 1945
-
Evaluations of Trinity, July 1945
-
Potsdam and the Final Decision to Bomb, July
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6,
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9,
1945
-
Japan Surrenders, August 10-15, 1945
-
The Manhattan Project and the Second World War,
1939-1945
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Sources and notes for this page.
The text for this page was adapted from, and portions
were taken directly from the
Office of History and Heritage Resources
publication:
Terrence R. Fehner and F. G. Gosling,
Origins of the Nevada Test Site (DOE/MA-0518;
Washington: History Division, Department of Energy,
December 2000), 30-33. See also Barton C. Hacker,
The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan
Project, 1942-1946
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987),
75-78, 84-86, 89-93, 98-108. The photographs of
the radiation safety team, the bunker at S-10,000, and
the tank Enrico Fermi used to roll up
on ground zero soon after the test are all courtesy the
Los Alamos National Laboratory. The map of the
Trinity Test Site is reproduced from
Vincent C. Jones,
Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 479.
The photograph of Stafford Warren is reprinted in
Vincent C. Jones,
Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 414.
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