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FIRST STEPS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
(1941-July 1945)
Events > Postscript -- The Nuclear Age, 1945-Present
- Informing the Public, August 1945
- The Manhattan Engineer District, 1945-1946
- First Steps toward International Control, 1944-1945
- Search for a Policy on International Control, 1945
- Negotiating International Control, 1945-1946
- Civilian Control of Atomic Energy, 1945-1946
- Operation Crossroads, July 1946
- The VENONA Intercepts, 1946-1980
- The Cold War, 1945-1990
- Nuclear Proliferation, 1949-present
Throughout most of the Second World War, officials gave little consideration to the postwar atom. Even at the
top echelons of government, few knew of the Manhattan Project, and among those
who did the primary concern was the ultimate success of the bomb development and
not possible impact of the bomb on postwar international relations. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of
Science and Research and Development and perhaps the President's closest
adviser on the bomb, discussed "after-war control" on October 9, 1941, "at some length" but there was no follow-up.
The
more immediate problem at the
time was the extent of the wartime atomic partnership with Great Britain.
The British had been instrumental in prodding the Americans into initiating a
full-fledged atomic bomb program, but in 1942 as the Manhattan Project geared up
the Americans instituted only a very limited interchange with their wartime
allies. Pressing hard for full interchange, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill took advantage of the situation to push his own ideas on the postwar
atom to the forefront. Churchill feared what he called "the threat from the
east," a thinly veiled reference to the Soviet Union, the third of the "Big
Three" allies in the fight against Nazi Germany. "Unless Americans and
Britons worked together," he told Bush, "Germany or Russia might win the
race for a weapon they could use for international blackmail." Churchill
envisioned an Anglo-American atomic monopoly that would not only win the war but
secure the postwar peace. In the August 1943 Quebec Agreement, which
renewed "full and effective" interchange between Great Britain and the
United States, the two nations pledged not to use the bomb either against each
other or against a third party without mutual consent. Nor would either
nation reveal information about the bomb to third parties without mutual
consent. In the September 18, 1944, Hyde Park aide-mémoire, Churchill and
Roosevelt agreed that the bomb should be kept in the "utmost secrecy" and
that "full collaboration" between the two nations in the military and
commercial development of the atom should continue after the war. Any suggestion
that the world be informed about the bomb as a prelude to an international
agreement regarding its control and use, the agreement noted, was "not accepted."
Roosevelt
did not show the aide-mémoire to any of his advisers. After meeting with
the President several days later, Bush suspected that Roosevelt contemplated a
postwar Anglo-American agreement to hold the bomb closely and control the peace
of the world. The problem with this, Bush told Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, was that it might prompt the Soviets to extraordinary efforts to
develop their own bomb and lead eventually to a catastrophic conflict. At
Stimson's urging, Bush and James Conant, chairman of the National Defense
Research Committee, prepared their own analysis of an approach to postwar
international control. Noting that the Soviets could develop a bomb in
three or four years, they concluded that a fatal arms competition might be
forestalled by the free interchange of all scientific information under the
aegis of an international control organization. The organization would
have unimpeded access to all atomic energy laboratories, industrial plants, and
military facilities throughout the world.
Neither Bush nor Stimson ever
forwarded the proposal to Roosevelt, but by spring 1945, with the end of the war
in sight, postwar considerations became more pressing. In early May,
Stimson formed an Interim Committee of top officials charged with recommending
the proper use of atomic weapons in wartime and developing a position for the
United States on postwar atomic policy. In his opening remarks to the
committee, Stimson noted that the bomb should not be regarded "as a new weapon
merely but as a revolutionary change in the relations of man to the
universe." The atomic bomb might be "a Frankenstein which would eat us
up," he added, or it might be the means "by which the peace of the world
would be helped in becoming secure." An awareness of being at such a
crossroads, however, did not necessarily offer a clear vision as to the policy
path that would lead to the desired outcome. Stimson himself was unsure.
Roosevelt, who had died in April, had left an ambiguous legacy. His
successor, Harry S. Truman, had only just been informed of the bomb project and
had no knowledge of the Hyde Park aide-mémoire. Bush and Conant favored
free exchange of information within an international control organization.
Contending that it would take twenty years for the Soviets to develop atomic
weapons, General Leslie Groves believed that possession of the bomb would
give the United States long-term military and diplomatic advantage.
Truman's Secretary of State-designate James F. Byrnes argued for pushing
forward unilaterally as fast as possible with research and production and using
the atomic monopoly to make the Soviets more manageable.
Not surprisingly, the Interim Committee
deliberations failed to result in definitive conclusions on the postwar atom. Following the general lead of Byrnes, the committee tentatively decided
that the United States needed to maintain a position of nuclear superiority
while at the same time pursuing adequate political agreements with the Soviet
Union. Briefing Truman on June 6 regarding the committee's suggestions
on international control, Stimson noted that all countries would make public
work being done on atomic energy. An international control committee, with
complete power to inspect, would be created to assure compliance.
Admitting the imperfections in the plan, Stimson stated that the Soviets might
not agree to it. Should an agreement prove impossible, he thought that the
United States could accumulate sufficient fissionable material to avoid being
caught helpless. Stimson emphasized that under no conditions would secrets
be disclosed until international control was established. Two weeks later,
the Interim Committee, at the urging of Robert Oppenheimer and other scientists,
recommended that Truman advise the Soviets that the United States was working on
the atomic bomb and expected to use it against Japan. The committee added
that the President might also suggest future discussions to insure that "the
weapon would become an aid to peace."
The
atomic bomb loomed ever larger
in policy calculations as the war neared its end. Dependent diplomatically
on a weapon that had been neither tested nor proved in combat, American
officials scheduled the opening of the next meeting of the Big Three leaders at
the Potsdam Conference in Berlin to coincide with the anticipated Trinity
test. The successful test on July 16 buoyed Truman's confidence and
hardened his resolve toward the Soviet Union. Churchill described the bomb
as "a miracle of deliverance." Stimson later called it "a badly
needed 'equalizer'." Dealing with the Soviets
firsthand at Potsdam, however, started to wear on Stimson, and he began to
reconsider international control. In a memorandum to the President, he
noted that no control organization could function effectively if it had to rely
on an autocratic nation dependent on secret political police who denied basic
civil liberties. The United States needed to ask itself, he continued, if
it dared share atomic secrets with the Soviets under any system of international
control. The nation should proceed slowly, he concluded, and consider how
it could use its atomic monopoly to remove the essential difficulty - the
character of the Soviet state. Apparently taking Stimson's advice to
heart, Truman and Byrnes decided to inform Soviet leader Josef Stalin about the
bomb while revealing as little about it as possible. Upon the close of a
plenary session on July 24, Truman, without his interpreter, casually walked
over to where Stalin was standing and informed him that the United States had a
new weapon of unusually destructive force. Stalin, who through Soviet
espionage and unbeknownst to Truman was well aware of the atomic bomb, replied
that he was glad to hear it and hoped that it would be used against Japan to
good effect. Saying nothing about future discussions regarding the bomb as
an "aid to peace," Truman had done the minimum necessary to warn the
Soviets of the impending use of the bomb.
- Informing the Public, August 1945
- The Manhattan Engineer District, 1945-1946
- First Steps toward International Control, 1944-1945
- Search for a Policy on International Control, 1945
- Negotiating International Control, 1945-1946
- Civilian Control of Atomic Energy, 1945-1946
- Operation Crossroads, July 1946
- The VENONA Intercepts, 1946-1980
- The Cold War, 1945-1990
- Nuclear Proliferation, 1949-present
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Sources and notes for this page.
The text for this page is original to the Department of Energy's Office of History
and Heritage Resources. Portions were adapted from the History Office
publications: F. G. Gosling, The Manhattan
Project: Making the Atomic Bomb (DOE/MA-0001; Washington: History Division,
Department of Energy, January 1999), 55-57, and Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar
E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939-1946: Volume I, A History of the
United States Atomic Energy Commission (Washington: U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, 1972), 325-331, 352, 357, 360-361, 367-369, 388, 390-391,
393-394. Also used were Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic
Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 38, 204-207,
215-216, 220-228, and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the
Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 98-120,
125-126. On postwar atomic alternatives and the Interim Committee, see Sherwin,
A World Destroyed, 121-128; 204-209, and Hewlett and Anderson, New
World, 325-331, 354-360. On General Leslie Groves's view of the
postwar bomb, see L.R. Groves memorandum, January 2, 1946, in Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume I, General, The United Nations
(Department of State Publication 8573, 1972), 1197-1203. The photographs of the
Yalta Conference and Henry L. Stimson are courtesy the National Archives. The photograph of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Quebec
Conference is reprinted in Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, opposite
page 272; the man in between them is the Earl of Athlone, Governor-General of
Canada, and the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, is over Roosevelt's
right shoulder. Click here for information on
the photograph of Vannevar Bush and James Conant. The photograph of the
Potsdam conference is courtesy the Truman
Presidential Library.
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