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GROVES AND THE MED (1942)
Events
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Difficult Choices, 1942
The summer of 1942 proved to be a troublesome one for the
fledgling bomb project. Colonel James C. Marshall
(right) received the assignment of directing the
Laboratory for the Development of Substitute Metals, or
DSM, the military's initial cover name for the
project. Marshall immediately moved from Syracuse,
where he served in the Corps's Syracuse Engineer
District, to New York City. Concerned that the name DSM
would attract too much attention, the military set up the
Manhattan Engineer District (MED), established by general
order on August 13. Marshall, like most other Army
officers, knew nothing of nuclear physics.
Furthermore, Marshall and his Army superiors were disposed
to move cautiously. In one case, for instance, Marshall
delayed purchase of an excellent production site in
Tennessee pending further study, while the scientists who
had been involved in the project from the start were
pressing for immediate purchase. Although
Vannevar Bush had carefully managed the
transition to Army control, there was not yet a mechanism
to arbitrate disagreements between the
S-1 Committee and the military. The
resulting lack of coordination complicated attempts to
gain a higher priority for scarce materials and boded ill
for the future of the entire bomb project.
In September, Bush and the Army agreed that an officer
other than Marshall should be given the assignment of
overseeing the entire atomic project, which by now was
referred to as the Manhattan Project. On September
17, the Army appointed Colonel
Leslie R. Groves (left) to head the
effort. Six days late, he was promoted to Brigadier
General. Groves was an engineer with impressive
credentials, including building of the Pentagon, and, most
importantly, had strong administrative abilities.
Within two days, Groves acted to obtain the Tennessee site
and secured a higher priority rating for project
materials. In addition, Groves moved the Manhattan
Engineer District headquarters from New York to
Washington. He quickly recognized the talents of
Marshall's deputy, Colonel Kenneth D. Nichols, and
arranged for Nichols to work as his chief aide and
troubleshooter throughout the war.
Meanwhile Bush, with the help and authority of Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson, set up the Military Policy
Committee, including one representative each from the
Army, the Navy, and the
Office of Scientific Research and Development. Bush hoped that scientists would have better
access to decision making in the new structure than they
had enjoyed when DSM and S-1 operated as parallel but
separate units. With Groves in overall command
(Marshall remained as District Engineer, where his
cautious nature proved useful in later decision making)
and the Military Policy Committee in place (the Top Policy
Group retained broad policy authority), Bush felt that
early organizational deficiencies had been
remedied. In October 1942, Groves also accepted
the suggestion forwarded by
Robert Oppenheimer and others to
concentrate in an isolated location all research on the
design of the bombs themselves. The search soon
began for the site of what would become the
Los Alamos laboratory.
During summer and fall 1942, technical and administrative
difficulties were still severe. Each of the four
processes for producing fissionable material for a bomb
remained under consideration, but a full-scale commitment
to all four posed serious problems, even with the
project's high priority. When Groves took command in
mid-September, he made it clear that by late 1942
decisions would be made as to which process or processes
promised to produce a bomb in the shortest amount of
time. The exigencies of war, Groves held, required
scientists to move from laboratory research to development
and production in record time. Though traditional
scientific caution might be short-circuited in the
process, there was no alternative if a bomb was to be
built in time to be used in the current conflict. As
everyone involved in the Manhattan Project soon learned,
Groves never lost sight of this goal and made all his
decisions accordingly.
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Sources and notes for this page.
The text for this page was adapted from, and portions
were taken directly from the
Office of History and Heritage Resources
publications:
F. G. Gosling,
The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb
(DOE/MA-0001; Washington: History Division, Department
of Energy, January 1999), 13-14, and Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson,
Jr., The New World, 1939-1946: Volume I,
A History of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission
(Washington: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1972),
82-83. The photograph of James Marshall and the
photograph of Leslie Groves are
reprinted from page 42 and the inside front cover,
respectively, of Vincent C. Jones,
Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1988). The
photograph of Vannevar Bush,
James Conant, Groves, and Franklin
Matthias is courtesy the DuPont Corporation; it is
reprinted in Stephane Groueff,
Manhattan Project: The Untold Story of the Making of
the Atomic Bomb
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967). The
photograph of Groves with
Robert Oppenheimer is courtesy the
Department of Energy.
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