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FINAL BOMB DESIGN (Los Alamos: Laboratory, 1944-1945)
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Bringing It All Together, 1942-1945
Late in 1944, Los Alamos began to shift
from research to development and bomb production.
Increased production at Oak Ridge and Hanford seemed to
promise that enough
plutonium and enriched uranium would be
available
for at least one bomb using each. Germany no longer
was the intended primary target. The war in Europe
(left) appeared to be entering its final phase, and
evidence uncovered by the
ALSOS mission
in November 1944 indicated that the German atomic program
had not gone beyond the research phase. Already by
summer 1944, Groves and his advisers had turned their
sights toward Japan. The atomic bomb would
justify the years of effort, including both the vast
expenditures and the judgment of everyone responsible, by
bringing the war in the Pacific to a fiery end.
Ongoing problems continued to complicate the efforts of
Robert Oppenheimer (right) to finalize bomb
design. Foremost among these were continuing personnel
shortages, particularly of physicists, and supply
difficulties. The procurement system, designed to protect
the secrecy of the Los Alamos project, led to frustrating
delays and, when
combined with persistent late war shortages, proved a
constant headache. The lack of contact between the
remote laboratory and its supply sources exacerbated the
problem, as did the relative lack of experience the academic
scientists had with logistical matters.
Leslie Groves and
James Conant were determined not to let
mundane problems compromise the bomb effort, and in fall
1944 they made several changes to prevent this
possibility. Conant shipped as many scientists as
could be spared from the Met Lab and
Oak Ridge to Los Alamos, hired every
civilian machinist he could lay his hands on, and arranged
for Army enlisted men to supplement the work force (these
GIs were known as
SEDS ("Special Engineering Detachment"). Hartley Rowe, an experienced industrial engineer,
provided help in easing the transition from research to
production. Los Alamos also arranged for a rocket
research team at the California Institute of Technology to
aid in procurement, test fuses, and contribute to component
development. These changes kept Los Alamos on track as
design work reached its final stages.
Weapon design for the uranium
gun-type bomb was frozen in February
1945. Confidence in the weapon was high enough that
a test prior to combat use was seen as unnecessary.
The design for an implosion device was
approved in March with a test of the more problematic
plutonium weapon scheduled for July 4. Oppenheimer
shifted the laboratory into high gear and assigned Samuel
Allison, Robert Bacher, and George Kistiakowsky to the
Cowpuncher Committee to "ride herd" on the
implosion weapon. He placed Kenneth T. Bainbridge
(right) in charge of Project Trinity, a new division to
oversee the
July test firing. "Deke" Parsons headed Project Alberta,
known as Project A, which had the responsibility for
preparing and delivering weapons for combat.
The bombs had to be physically assembled at Los Alamos,
and this depended largely on the ability of the chemists
and metallurgists to process the uranium and plutonium
into metal and craft them into the correct shape and
size. Plutonium (left) posed by far the greater
obstacle. It existed in different states, depending
upon temperature, and was extremely toxic. Working
under intense pressure, the chemists and metallurgists
managed to develop precise techniques for processing
plutonium just before it arrived in quantity beginning in
May.
As a result of progress at Oak Ridge and metallurgical
and chemical refinements on plutonium that improved
implosion's chances, the nine months between July 1944 and
April 1945 saw the American bomb project progress from
doubtful to probable. The August 1 delivery date for
the "Little Boy" uranium bomb (right) certainly
appeared more likely than it had when Groves briefed
George Marshall. There would be no implosion weapons
in the first half of 1945 as Groves had hoped, but
developments in April boded well for the scheduled summer
test of the "Fat Man" plutonium bomb. And
recent calculations provided by Hans Bethe's theoretical
group gave hope that the yield for the first weapon would
be in the vicinity of 5,000 tons of TNT rather than the
1,000-ton estimate provided in fall 1944.
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Sources and notes for this page.
The text for this page was adapted from, and portions
were taken directly from the
Office of History and Heritage Resources
publications:
F. G. Gosling,
The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb
(DOE/MA-0001; Washington: History Division, Department
of Energy, January 1999), 42-43, and Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson,
Jr., The New World, 1939-1946: Volume I,
A History of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission
(Washington: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1972), 253,
321. Click
here for information on the animation of the first
0.11 seconds of the explosion. The photograph of "D-Day" is courtesy
the
National Archives. The photograph of
Robert Oppenheimer in front of a
blackboard is reproduced by permission of the J. Robert
Oppenheimer Memorial Committee. The photograph of
SED Herb Lehr holding the Gadget's core
is courtesy the
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); it is reprinted in Rachel Fermi and Esther Samra,
Picturing the Bomb: Photographs from the Secret World
of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers, 1995),
138. The photograph of Kenneth Bainbridge is
courtesy LANL. The photograph of the buttons of
plutonium metal at
Los Alamos in 1945 is courtesy LANL
(via the
Federation of American Scientists). The photograph of Little Boy is courtesy the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (via the National
Archives).
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