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Title: Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach

Journal Article · · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
 [1];  [2]; ORCiD logo [3]
  1. Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States). Electricity Infrastructure
  2. Schlumberger, Sugar Land, TX (United States). Pressure Pumping and Chemistry Product Group
  3. Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, WY (United States). Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering

GPS spoofing attack (GSA) has been shown to be one of the most imminent threats to almost all cyber-physical systems incorporated with the civilian GPS signal. Specifically, for our current agenda of the modernization of the power grid, this may greatly jeopardize the benefits provided by the pervasively installed phasor measurement units (PMU). In this study, we consider the case where synchrophasor data from PMUs are compromised due to the presence of a single GSA, and show that it can be corrected by signal processing techniques. In particular, we introduce a statistical model for synchrophasorbased power system state estimation (SE), and then derive the spoofing-matched algorithms for synchrophasor data correction against GPS spoofing attack. Different testing scenarios in IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, 118-bus systems are simulated to show the proposed algorithms’ performance on GSA detection and state estimation. Numerical results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms can consistently locate and correct the spoofed synchrophasor data with good accuracy as long as the system observability is satisfied. Finally, the accuracy of state estimation is significantly improved compared with the traditional weighted least square method and approaches the performance under the Genie-aided method.

Research Organization:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, WY (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE Office of Science (SC), Basic Energy Sciences (BES); USDOE Office of Electricity (OE)
Grant/Contract Number:
AC05-76RL01830; SC0012671; OE0000657
OSTI ID:
1438224
Report Number(s):
PNNL-SA-129371
Journal Information:
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Vol. 9, Issue 5; ISSN 1949-3053
Publisher:
IEEECopyright Statement
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Citation Metrics:
Cited by: 65 works
Citation information provided by
Web of Science

Cited By (3)

Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies journal December 2018
Impact of Cyber Attacks on High Voltage DC Transmission Damping Control journal April 2018
A Survey on Synchrophasor Data Quality and Cybersecurity Challenges, and Evaluation of their Interdependencies text January 2018

Figures / Tables (13)


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