Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems
Journal Article
·
· IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Southern Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX (United States)
- Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
Due to the vulnerability of civilian global positioning system (GPS) signals, the accuracy of phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be greatly compromised by GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs), which introduce phase shifts into true phase angle measurements. Focusing on simultaneous GSAs for multiple PMU locations, this paper proposes a novel identification and correction algorithm in distribution systems. A sensitivity analysis of state estimation residuals on a single GSA phase angle is firstly implemented. An identification algorithm using a probing technique is proposed to determine the locations of spoofed PMUs and the ranges of GSA phase shifts. Based on the identification results, these GSA phase shifts are determined via an estimation algorithm that minimizes the mismatch between measurements and system states. Finally, with the attacked PMU data corrected, the system states are recovered. Simulations in unbalanced IEEE 34-bus and 123-bus distribution systems demonstrates the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method.
- Research Organization:
- Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
- Grant/Contract Number:
- AC02-06CH11357
- OSTI ID:
- 1616698
- Journal Information:
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Journal Name: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid Journal Issue: 1 Vol. 11; ISSN 1949-3053
- Publisher:
- IEEECopyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Internet of Things for Sustainability: Perspectives in Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Future Trends
|
book | December 2019 |
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