G. MATERIALS

1a. Unclassified. Identification only as used in unspecified nuclear weapons: U-233, U-235, U-238, Pu-239, Li-6, Li-7, deuterium (H-2), tritium (H-3), and combinations of Li-6 or Li-7 with deuterium and tritium.

1b. Classified. Identification of fuel materials for weapons except as specified in topic 1a (see also section 3.4B).

2b. Classified. Isotopic assay, phase, physical state, chemical form, alloy composition, or function of a fuel material which would reveal important information concerning the design or functioning of a nuclear weapon.

3b. Classified. Quantities of nuclear fuel allocated to weapons use: total, partial, or amount used in specified or unspecified weapons.

4b. Classified. Selection, composition, or properties of nonfuel materials which would reveal information of importance to nuclear weapon design.

5a. Unclassified. Identification of normal or depleted uranium, tungsten, beryllium, and steel as used for tampers in unspecified weapons.

5b. Classified. Identification of materials used as tampers in specific weapons (other than the Trinity device).

H. SPECIAL APPLICATIONS

Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)

While the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program has applications to both nuclear weapon physics and, in the long term, to energy production, the weapon physics aspects cause certain ICF information to be classified. Therefore, ICF is included in this section because it relates to nuclear weapon physics and involves areas of work that are classified. Some indirectly driven ICF targets (i.e., ones in which radiation from the conversion of the focused laser or particle beam energy is contained and used to transfer energy to compress and ignite a physically separate component - or fuel capsule - containing thermonuclear fuel) have features that are similar to nuclear weapon designs. Also, some ICF simulation codes are classified.

1a. Unclassified. Studies of the application of lasers or other pulsed energy sources, "drivers", to produce thermonuclear energy (i.e., Inertial Confinement Fusion) that are not directly relevant to nuclear weapon design.

1b. Classified. Studies of inertial confinement fusion that reveal classified aspects of nuclear weapon design or that would be useful in the design or fabrication of nuclear weapons.

2a. Unclassified. That ICF and nuclear weapons involve some of the same physical phenomena connected with the implosion, ignition, and burn of fusion fuel; i.e., fusion, hydrodynamics, and transport of neutrons, photons, and charged particles.

3a. Unclassified. All aspects of laboratory ICF "drivers" such as lasers and charged particle beams.

4a. Unclassified. Fabrication techniques for ICF targets (but see 4b).

4b. Classified. Fabrication techniques that reveal classified information concerning target design or nuclear weapons technology.

5a. Unclassified. Fact that ICF explosions can be used to model large TN explosions and can be used to study some aspects of nuclear weapon technology; e.g., nuclear weapon physics, effects, and material properties such as EOS and opacity.

5b. Classified. Comparisons between design or operation of ICF targets and nuclear weapons. Use of classified nuclear weapon concepts in the ICF context.

6a. Unclassified. All information on laboratory ICF targets which meet all the following conditions: fuel capsule dimensions no larger than 1 cm, fuel capsule absorbed energy no greater than 10 MJ [NOTE 4], driving temperature no greater than 350eV, and no fissile material, not revealing classified weapons physics or material properties.

6b. Classified. All information on ICF targets with any of the following: fuel capsule dimensions greater than 1cm, fuel capsule absorbed energy greater than 10 MJ[NOTE 4], driving temperature above 350eV, or containing fissile material. Also, information concerning ICF targets which reveals classified weapons information or material properties.

7a. Unclassified. The fact that some laboratory ICF targets are not directly driven, but indirectly driven by x-rays from the conversion of the focused energy (e.g., from a laser or particle beam) which are contained and used to transfer energy to compress and ignite a physically separate component (fuel capsule) containing thermonuclear fuel.

8a. Unclassified. Specified integrated calculational results from a classified code (e.g., LASNEX) calculation on an unclassified target. Included are yield, fuel yield, output of neutrons and x rays (provided x-ray spectrum not more specific than a three- temperature blackbody fit), and peak fuel density, and temperature.

8b. Classified. Detailed calculational results from classified code calculations on unclassified targets (see 8a).

9a. Unclassified. The fact that ICF experiments were conducted in conjunction with unspecified NTS test events (Halite/Centurion Program).

9b. Classified. Any other information concerning HE or nuclear explosive-driven ICF.

Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons (NDEW)

The Nuclear Directed Energy Weapon (NDEW) program involves tailored use of nuclear explosives and has the potential for making a significant contribution to strategic defense. The reason for classifying NDEW information is to avoid aiding potential adversaries in: (1) developing NDEWs; (2) promoting the development of countermeasures; or (3) developing new strategies or shifts in deployments that could reduce the effectiveness of U.S. NDEWs.

10a The fact that the DOE is interested in or conducting research on NDEW concepts of certain specified generic types of output; i.e., x rays, visible light, microwaves, charged particles, and kinetic energy.

10b. Classified. Details of NDEW designs and outputs.

11a. Unclassified. General programmatic information (e.g., meetings, travel, construction, equipment procurement) not revealing technical status or program scope.

11b. Classified. Information that reveals the technical status or program scope of any type of NDEW.

12a. Unclassified. Fact that underground tests at the NTS have been a part of the NDEW research program.

13a. Unclassified. Association with NTS of nuclear explosive driven x-ray lasers or an unspecified NDEW, provided that the association does not relate to a specific nuclear event.

13b. Classified. Association of a nuclear explosive driven x-ray laser or an unspecified NDEW with a specific nuclear event.

3.5 ARMS CONTROL

Arms control information is classified as NSI to protect U.S. strategies or negotiating positions, U.S. technical capabilities to verify compliance with arms control treaties, and other related areas. Unlike RD, where DOE is designated by the Atomic Energy Act as the responsible agency for that type of information, arms control information is classified and declassified by a number of agencies covering various aspects of the arms control area. Therefore, it is important to perform a careful analysis when assessing the need to classify arms control information so as to avoid jeopardizing U.S. bargaining positions in international negotiations. It should also be kept in mind that information appearing in the public press or other publicly available documents is not necessarily unclassified.

1a. Unclassified. Information concerning U.S. arms control strategies or negotiating positions, treaty verification capabilities, treaty compliance record, or other U.S. arms control matters that have been properly declassified

1b. Classified. Proposed or approved U.S. strategies or negotiating positions involved with ongoing, planned, or recommended negotiations.

2b. Classified. Technical capabilities of the U.S. to verify compliance with ratified or unratified treaties.

3b. Classified. Authoritative detailed assessments of possible foreign government reactions to U.S. arms control proposals.

4b. Classified. Noncompliance with ratified or unratified treaties by any negotiating, signatory, or acceding parties.

5b. Classified. Information which is to be kept confidential under agreements with foreign Governments.

3.6 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear weapons and significant quantities of Special Nuclear Material (SNM), the security of DOE facilities and assets, and the security of classified information is important to the national security. Controllable information of this kind should be classified if it would provide assistance to a terrorist or other malefactor in: (1) theft of nuclear weapons or SNM; (2) sabotage of DOE facilities or assets; (3) composing a credible nuclear threat message; (4) illegally obtaining, diverting, or sabotaging nuclear material shipments; or (5) gaining unauthorized access to classified information including that in secure communications or in automated data processing (ADP) equipment and facilities. The policy is also meant to help limit nuclear proliferation by contributing to the protection of nuclear weapons and SNM from diversion or theft.

Providing security and safeguards for DOE information and assets is becoming increasingly complex and urgent due to technical advances and the growing number of potential adversaries. This has led to the need for protecting information within a wide range of activities. The present DOE safeguards and security policies include the following subject areas.

A. SNM CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In general, information concerning the overall sensitivity of the DOE measurement system to diversion, or information revealing classified features of weapons, classified throughput or other SNM quantities, should be classified.

1a. Unclassified. Total site inventories of Pu at all DOE sites except PANTEX. Inventories of highly radioactive waste materials.

1b. Classified. Inventories of HEU at DOE sites and of Pu and HEU at PANTEX site, or elsewhere if precise location is given. Y-12 inventories are classified.

2a. Unclassified. Historical annual inventory differences (after 6 months) at all DOE-sites, except for Y-12 and Rocky Flat sites.

2b. Classified. Annual inventory difference information for Pu and HEU at Y-12 and Rocky Flats sites, for any DOE site before 6 months, or for any facility if an investigation is in progress, and actual alarm limits for evaluation of inventory difference.

B. PHYSICAL PROTECTION

The general approach in classifying information concerning the physical protection system is to classify more stringently that information which contains detailed and site-specific information or which divulges serious vulnerabilities.

1a. Unclassified. Facility physical security features such as fences and guard towers, and activities such as routine guard patrols that are visible from uncontrolled areas.

1b. Classified. The physical security plan for a facility, the actual response time of guards and back-up forces, planned responses to a specific threat, concealed intrusion detection sensors and related security features, and vulnerabilities such as exploitable features of locks and tamper- indicating devices.

C. THREATS AND ATTACKS

In the past, various threats have been made against Government facilities. Threats will continue to be made. Information that may aid adversaries to achieve their goal should be classified so that they will have minimum access to helpful knowledge. Therefore, the DOE generic threat definition, for example, is classified to help deny an adversary an understanding of the design basis for DOE facility safeguards and security systems.

1a. Unclassified. Generalized description of adversary threats to DOE programs and facilities and the fact that nuclear threats are evaluated by DOE and the FBI.

1b. Classified. Detailed descriptions of the adversary threat to DOE programs and facilities, and technical indicators and certain techniques used to assess the credibility of a nuclear threat.

D. VULNERABILITIES

It is DOE policy to classify controllable information that could be of assistance to a terrorist or other malefactor in targeting DOE facilities or bypassing security measures in order to commit theft or diversion of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon parts, classified information, or SNM; sabotage; or other criminal acts that may adversely impact national security.

1a. Unclassified. Security-related information that is obtainable by visual access from uncontrolled areas or has been officially placed in the public domain.

1b. Classified. Information that could be of significant assistance to a terrorist or other malefactor in targeting DOE facilities or bypassing security measures in order to commit theft or diversion of nuclear weapons, classified information, or SNM; sabotage; or other criminal acts against DOE facilities and assets.

2a. Unclassified. Specified vulnerability at a specified DOE facility that has been corrected by a security-related upgrade and, therefore, the vulnerability no longer exists.

2b. Classified. Any details concerning vulnerabilities: location, nature, or extent.

E. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

Secure communications centers and protected distribution systems are potentially lucrative targets for the covert observer. Accordingly, the basic principle underlying communications security (COMSEC) classification policy is to protect information and equipment which, if released, would provide significant assistance in gaining access to classified information being protected by COMSEC measures.

1a. Unclassified. The fact that classified information is electrically transmitted in a secure mode and is securely processed on automated data processing equipment.

1b. Classified. Codes, passwords, and operational details of specialized equipment used to prevent unauthorized access to secure communications and automated data processing systems and facilities.