Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy, section V.D through
V.H
- 1. Research and development (includes reactions involving deuterium and
tritium)
- a. Physics of the light elements. (51-1)
- b. General statements concerning the relationship of commonly known
nuclear reactions of the light elements to developmental work on
thermonuclear weapons. (51-1)
- 2. Thermonuclear test devices shipping and handling container not
revealing nuclear or military characteristics. When object is not
specifically identified as an atomic weapon and no other information
concerning the nature or purpose of the object is revealed. (53-4)
- 3. Lithium and its compounds
- a. Lithium enriched in the isotope Li6; Material up to and including
1 kilogram contained Li6 total. (54-2)
- b. Lithium enriched in the isotope Li7; Material up to 15 kilograms
total contained Li7. (54-2)
- c. Other normal lithium compounds. (54-2)
- d. The fact that lithium, deuterium (Li6D, LiD) are used in unspecified
thermonuclear weapons. (62-7) (See also II.Q.7.)
- e. The mere fact that normal Lithium Deuteride (LinD) is used in
unspecified TN weapons. (67-1) (See also II.Q.9.)
- f. The assay of top product of Li6 production plant or the fact that this
top assay is used in weapons. (67-1) (See also II.Q.10.)
- g. The fact that Li6H is used in unspecified weapons for hardening.
(67-1) (See also II.Q.11.)
- h. The fact the Li7H or LinH may be used as mockup materials in the
weapons program. (67-1) (See also II.Q.12.)
- i. The fact that compounds of Li6 containing tritium are used in the
design of weapons as TN fuel. (72-11) (See also II.B.9. and II.Q.13.)
- 4. The date or estimate of the date when a thermonuclear weapon may be an
actuality. (54-2)
- 5. Visible size and shape only of externally carried thermonuclear weapons
when not identifiable as such. (57-1)
- 6. The size, weight and shape of some thermonuclear weapons (Any
information which reveals the existence of thermonuclear weapons with
diameter less than 24" or weight less than 2000 lb is classified). (59-7)
- a. Size, weight and shape of some thermonuclear weapons (Any
information which reveals the existence of thermonuclear weapon
with diameter less than 18 inches or weight less than 690 pounds is
classified). (60-1)
- b. The existence of, or the capability to design, a thermonuclear (TN)
weapon assembly system with a diameter of 8 inches or more.
(88-4)
- 7. The fact that certain of our operational missiles have thermonuclear
warheads. (62-7)
- 8. The fact that tests were conducted of designs which could lead to an
entirely new class of U.S. weapons which could have relatively low
weights and extremely high yields, with the fission contributions decreased
to only a few percent of the total yield. (63-1) (See also V.B.5.b.)
- 9. The fact that the yield-to-weight ratios of the new class of weapons
would
be more than twice that which can now be achieved in the design of very
high yield weapons using previously developed concepts. (63-1)
- 10. The United States, without further testing, can develop a warhead of
50-60
Mt for B-52 delivery." (63-3)
- 11. "... some improvement in high yield weapons design could be achieved
and
that new warheads -- for example a 35 Mt warhead for our Titan II --
based on these improvements could be stockpiled with confidence." (63-3)
- 12. The salvage value of the Mark 28 Nuclear Weapon recovered off the coast
at Palomares, Spain, was $164,000. (67-4)
- 13. The fact that approximately 6 kgs of plutonium were involved in
theGreenland accident. (68-4)
- a. Best estimate of the amount of plutonium removed from the site.
(68-4)
- 14. Information revealing the mere existence of TN devices with total yield
equal to or greater than 5 KT. (68-8)
- 15. The fact that the total number of Spartan and Sprint interceptors
planned
for the 4-site option at Minuteman sites is 120 Spartans and 264 Sprints.
(71-3)
- 16. The nuclear device to be tested in the Cannikin event is related to the
optimum development of a warhead for the Spartan missile of our
Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense Program. The measurements of device
performance which will be obtained from the test are essential to our
optimum defense deployment of safeguards for protection of our
Minuteman missile sites. (71-9) (See also V.B.3.rr.)
- 17. The fact that in thermonuclear (TN) weapons, a fission "primary" is
used
to trigger a TN reaction in thermonuclear fuel referred to as a "secondary".
(72-11)
- 18. The fact that, in thermonuclear weapons, radiation from a fission
explosive
can be contained and used to transfer energy to compress and ignite a
physically separate component containing thermonuclear fuel. (79-2)
Note: Any elaboration of this statement will be classified.
- 19. Primary/secondary information: The identity of a designated device
nickname/acronym as a primary or secondary. (93-2) (See also V.C.8.j.)
- 20. Secondary information: The fact that fissile and/or fissionable
materials are
present in some secondaries, materials unidentified except for uranium
(depleted, natural, and enriched including highly enriched uranium),
location unspecified, use unspecified, and weapon undesignated. (93-2)
- 21. Radiation case material information for unspecified weapons only:
- a. The fact of use of specific elements with atomic number (Z) greater
than 71 as radiation case materials. (93-2)
- b. The fact of use of specific unclassified alloys as radiation case
materials. (93-2)
- 1. The fact that DOE weapon laboratories are engaged in a research program
to explore the feasibility of a nuclear explosive driven directed energy
weapon. (82-2)
- 2. The fact that research is being conducted on the specific concept of a
nuclear pumped X-ray laser. (82-2)
- 3. Information concerning Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons (NDEW).
- a. The fact that the DOE is interested in or conducting research on
NDEW concepts of certain specified generic types of output; i.e.,
visible light, microwaves, charged particles, kinetic energy. (85-4)
- b. The fact that underground tests at the Nevada Test Site have been
and are a part of the NDEW research program. (85-4) (See also
V.B.3.hhh.)
- c. The fact that a specified NDEW could engage multiple targets by
using multiple beams from a single platform and hence is a high
leverage system. (85-4)
- d. The fact that an NDEW could have lethal ranges of thousands of
kilometers. (85-4)
- e. The fact that a kill mechanism for an x-ray laser is ablative shock.
(85-4)
- 4. Information concerning Directed Nuclear Energy Systems.
- a. Generalized description of DNES principles, as well as general
qualitative or quantitative information on the physics and
technology of low-power DNES research, that does not
substantially: (86-1)
- (1) Assist others in development of DNES weapons; or
- (2) Contribute to feasibility assessment of DNES weapon
development; or
- (3) Reveal programmatic directions.
- b. General qualitative descriptions of DNES program goals or
objectives that do not reveal classified milestones or
achievements or specific design characteristics. Classified
milestones and their achievements will be reviewed for release on a
case-by-case basis. (86-1)
- c. General studies of DNES special nuclear materials and their
physical properties. Specific special nuclear materials which
are developed for (and the specific conditions of their association
with) classified DNES projects and test device designs will remain
classified. (86-1)
- d. General studies of other DNES materials and their physical
properties. No material identities or associations will be
declassified where such information may be used to infer classified
DNES characteristics. (86-1)
- e. General DNES computational techniques or analytical procedures.
Computational techniques and procedures which utilize or
reveal specific design or operational characteristics will remain
classified. (86-1)
- 1. Existing storage site.
- a. Official names(s), nickname(s), and/or location, when association
with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) or AEC
is not revealed. (53-1)
- b. AEC storage sites (as pertains to all weapons in custody of AEC at
a National Storage Site (NSS) and an Operational Storage Site
(OSS)). (56-3)
- c. Location
- (1) When information does not explicitly reveal installation is a
storage site for nuclear weapons. (56-3)
- (2) DoD storage sites (as pertains to weapons in DoD custody
only). With delivery organizations and operating forces in
the U.S. or overseas. (56-3)
- (a) Fact that particular aircraft squadron, naval vessel, or
special weapons organization has capability of
storing or handling nuclear weapons. (56-3)
- d. The approximate location of some of the national stockpile sites
and operational stockpile sites provided no indication is given
as to the total number of storage sites. (59-7)
- 2. Future storage sites
- a. Official name(s), nickname(s), and/or location, when association
with AFSWP or AEC is not revealed. Future storage sites become
existing storage sites at the time of administrative manning. (53-1)
- 3. Surveillance program. Mere existence of maintenance or surveillance
program. (53-1)
- 4. "In certain areas Soviet nuclear technology equals and in some areas
even
exceeds that of the U.S., although our overall capability and means of
delivery are believed to be superior to the Soviets." (62-1)
- 5. "The U.S. has a nuclear weapon in stockpile with a yield of
approximately
25 megatons." (62-4)
- 6. "The world was shocked by the 60 megaton test on October 30th. The
U.S. analysis has shown that this device used a lead jacket around the
fusion materials, and gave only a few megatons fission. Thus the Russians
reduced the fallout, especially that which might have fallen on their own
country. If lead were replaced by uranium, the Russian device would give
100 megatons or slightly more." (62-4)
- 7. The identification of U.S. TX, XW, or Mark numbers with U.S. missile
names. (62-7)
- 8. "In order to achieve it, we maintain a total number of nuclear warheads,
tactical as well as strategic, in the tens of thousands." (63-3)
- 9. The fact that we have deployed thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe. (63-4)
- a. The fact that the total kiloton yield of these weapons is well
in excess of ten thousand times the total yield of the nuclear
weapons used at the end of World War II. (63-4)
- 10. "In presenting this proposal, it could be stated that 'several
thousand'
nuclear weapons could be involved." This statement is contained in a U.S.
Position paper on the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons to Obtain
Fissionable Materials for Transfer Under a Cutoff and Transfer Agreement.
(65-3)
- 11. "The number of nuclear warheads in strategic alert forces has increased
from 850 on June 30, 1961 to 2700 estimated as of June 30, 1965."
(65-5)
- 12. "The fact that U.S. strategic forces have an inventory of nuclear
warheads
in excess of 5,000, that the number of nuclear warheads furnished to the
Alliance and stored in inventory in Western Europe has exceeded 5,000
nuclear warheads, and that this number will increase by more than 20%
during the next six months." (65-7)
- 13. The minimum spacing for specific nuclear weapons or nuclear components
in storage or transit. (67-1)
- 14. Statements that qualitatively reveal that a nuclear weapon is
satisfactory.
(67-1)
- 15. Statements that quantitatively reveal specific component quality or
reliability requirements. (67-1)
- 16. The fact that U.S. nuclear artillery shells are located in Germany.
(73-6)
- 17. The estimated costs for the proposed improved nuclear artillery shells
as
$452,000 each for the MK-74 (155mm) and $400,000 each for the MK-75
(8 inch). (73-6)
- 18. The fact that any particular reactor product is being or has been
stockpiled
for military use. (73-8)
- 19. Information concerning the weapons stockpile: (81-1)
Fiscal Year
1945 1946 1947 1948
Number of non-nuclear components
1. Gun-type 0 0 (0) (2)
2. Implosion 2 9 (29) (53)
Number of nuclear components
3. Gun-type 0 0 0 0
4. Implosion-type 2 9 13 50
Numbers in parentheses declassified in 1976.
- 20. Descriptions of historical and future trends in the total number of
nuclear
weapons in, or megatonnage of, the total stockpile which are:
- a. Qualitative. (82-1)
- b. Expressed as a percentage change over any time period or
on an unscaled graph with a scaled time axis for the past,
present, or future up to and including the approved period of
the current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum
(usually five fiscal years beyond the current fiscal year).
(82-1)
Note: Remains classified if dramatic trend
changes result from significant unplanned events
such as major technical or production problems,
sabotage, natural or man-made disasters, etc.
- 21. Descriptions of trends for any time period in nuclear weapon
production or retirement rates which are qualitative, including
relative comparisons of the production rate versus the retirement
rate. (82-1)
- 22. The fact that the total nuclear weapons stockpile contains a few
tens of thousands of weapons (no numbers specified). (82-1)
- 23. The unelaborated fact of the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the
U.K.
(84-1)
- 1. The mere fact that the U.S. is interested in pursuing a program to
determine the characteristics of an "enhanced radiation" weapon (neutron
bomb). (63-5)
- 2. The fact that we are interested in and are continuing studies on a
weapon
for minimizing the emerging flux of neutrons and internal induced activity.
(67-1)
- 3. The fact that the W-79 is an enhanced radiation weapon. (78-1)
- 1. The fact of weapon laboratory interest in MRR devices. (76-3)
- 2. The fact of successful development of MRR devices. (76-3)
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