CHAPTER 6
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM (NEST)

This chapter is for the use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) information. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). These documents are exempted from automatic declassification procedures as outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption to automatic declassification is section 3.4(b)(2) and (8) of E.O. 12958 which read:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . specific information, the release of which should be expected to: . . .

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction; . . .

(8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans. "

The information discussed in this chapter concerns NEST assets, capabilities, equipment, procedures, and operations still currently being used to: (1) search for and aid in the recovery of lost nuclear weapons or materials; and (2) aid the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the events of a crime involving the theft or alleged theft of a nuclear weapon, an improvised nuclear device (IND), or a radiation dispersal device (RDD), or involving any other aspect of nuclear weapons, explosives, devices, or nuclear materials use.

The NEST is a group of personnel with special expertise and equipment managed and directed by DOE's Nevada Operations Office (NV) on authority delegated by DOE's Director of the Office of Military Application (OMA). The equipment and personnel of NEST have been assembled and developed by DOE for use in locating diverted special nuclear material (SNM) and in locating, identifying, and providing guidance for rendering safe nuclear weapons, IND, or RDD made or held in violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. An example of the specialized equipment available to the NEST was the early Surveillance Accident Nuclear Detection System (SANDS) which has evolved with time. This equipment includes various nuclear radiation detection systems developed for the OMA for use in surveying an area for lost or diverted nuclear weapons and SNM. It is also used in delineating the distribution of radioactive material resulting from a nuclear accident.

BROAD GUIDANCE

Because the technology applied to the development of SANDS and other NEST related equipment is derived from both unclassified and classified DOE and Department of Defense (DOD) programs, it is important to classify certain aspects of the systems both as to intent and capability. Specifically, while the general ability in either ground or air search modes to locate radiation sources is unclassified, it is important to protect the extent or details of this capability to detect lost or diverted nuclear weapons or SNM. This is especially important when there are shortcomings in the ability of NEST equipment to locate the target materials which if known by adversaries could be used to defeat the search equipment and/or procedures. Current operational procedures must also be protected to deny any potential threat from developing measures to counter the rapid execution of the appropriate emergency response plan being executed by the NEST. This is particularly important in view of increased terrorist activities.

Information concerning the composition of NEST, its equipment and system capabilities, its limitations, and its current operational procedures are the foundation of national security emergency preparedness plans that will remain in effect for the foreseeable future. It is expected that NEST capabilities will remain evolutionary, not revolutionary, in nature and therefore, automatic downgrading of such information is not appropriate.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing information concerning NEST not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 7
VULNERABILITY AND HARDENING TECHNOLOGY

This chapter is for the use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning vulnerability and hardening technology. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to vulnerability, hardness, and hardening technology of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to nuclear weapons effects. These documents are exempted from automatic declassification procedures as outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption to automatic declassification is section 3.4(b)(2) of E.O. 12958 which reads:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which should be expected to: . . .

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."

Vulnerability and hardening information pertaining to nuclear weapons and the components of nuclear weapons is classified as Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) and is not subject to this guide. However, there is also vulnerability and hardening information which pertains to the nuclear weapon's delivery system (e.g., missiles or aircraft); such information is classified NSI and, therefore, is subject to this declassification guide.

The susceptibility of a delivery vehicle or any of its parts to damage or destruction as the result of a defensive effort, usually an adversary's nuclear burst, is its vulnerability. Hardening is the term applied to intentional measures taken to reduce that vulnerability. Hardening contrasts with hardness, because an item's hardness may not include actual hardening (i.e., functional design, space limitations, weight limits, etc.). In other words, the hardness of a weapon or component may result from intrinsic hardness, from hardening measures, or both.

Vulnerability to an enemy's nuclear defenses is a vital concern. Hardening is more often required in long-range strategic weapons than in tactical missiles, aircraft delivered bombs, or battlefield weapons. Concern about fratricidal effects can be a motivation in hardening some types of weapons.

When a delivery vehicle or component is hardened, the maximum severity of each environment in which the delivery vehicle is expected to operate is specified. Of course, the specified hardness level cannot be arbitrarily high. Hardening limits imposed by cost or technology render weapons from achieving a state of invulnerability to an arbitrarily severe threat. The objective of hardening is to force an adversary to create a substantially increased hostile environment to defeat the weapon system, over that necessary if no hardening were present.

Nuclear burst effects against which delivery vehicles may be hardened include x-rays, neutrons, several forms of nuclear electromagnetic pulses (EMP), gamma rays, blast, and thermal. The maximum severity of each effect to which a nuclear weapon system is hardened, also referred to as system level, can be found in the stockpile-to-target sequence document that is generated for each program.

Radiation shielding is often used to accomplish hardening. The materials and techniques used vary from one effect to another. Due to the high energy levels associated with gamma rays and the weight and thickness of material required to stop them, shielding a weapon system against gamma rays is impractical. Hardening is a primary concern against the secondary effects of gamma rays. Gamma rays emitted by a defensive burst interact with the surrounding medium. This interaction is responsible for the processes that give rise to EMP. This secondary effect of gamma rays, EMP, causes electrical currents and voltages to be generated within the irradiated system and may result in either transient or permanent damage to the system. Blast protection is often satisfied by paying special attention to the ruggedness of weapon structures already present for other purposes. The hardening of electronic systems and discrete semiconductor devices to radiation effects has become a major technical discipline in its own right, where radiation tolerance is generally achieved by special design techniques and carefully controlled processing or fabrication measures.

BROAD GUIDANCE

The principal reason for classifying vulnerability, hardness and hardening technology concerning nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles is to deny an adversary information about a given weapon's vulnerability or hardness that might help defeat that weapon. This also applies to pre-1976 weapon systems.

Although most generic information about the nature and physics of weapon x-ray output and effects has been declassified, nearly all information about x-ray hardening materials and shielding techniques remains classified to avoid making the technology gratuitously available. Most x-ray hardening methodology is only applicable to nuclear weapon system design and, therefore, is not available from applications associated with commercial use.

When not applied to a particular weapon's hardening measures, pre-1976 information about most of the materials and methodologies used to harden against effects other than x-rays is not classified. This is true for two main reasons: 1) materials and general shielding methods of practical use against each nuclear burst effect can be deduced from the unclassified physics of that effect, and 2) many hardening techniques come from, or are the same as, unclassified nonweapon technology on how to deal with the various nuclear effects especially for use in nuclear energy production. Other applications of this technology are: radiation and neutron shielding for reactor and space-borne systems; standard electromagnetic radiation (EMR) and radio frequency (RF) electrical shielding and avoidance methodology; and shielding for radiation effects in semiconductors and electronics. Nearly all of this generic hardening information has been declassified, or never was classified. New developments in hardening technology were often classified until an evaluation of their actual importance and need for continued classification was made.

Classified information about a delivery vehicle (e.g., aircraft, missile) and its components is NSI. Design information, hardware, and test analyses that reveal a specific delivery vehicle's overall vulnerability or hardness level for any effect is classified Secret NSI. Adverse conditions that seriously jeopardize a strategic or other major weapon capability may be classified Top Secret NSI. Hardening information that does not reveal levels for a given weapon is nearly all unclassified, except in the area of x-ray hardening. These statements constitute the general, overriding principle by which classification in the vulnerability, hardness, and hardening areas is determined. In dealing with any effect, however, all classified weapon output information is RD.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing information concerning vulnerability hardening technology of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

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