Defense and stability
This study is a further extension of our investigations into prevenient stability; here, we look at the effects of strategic defensive systems. We use the Exchange code to examine the changes in crisis stability and deterrence brought about by various levels of strategic defense for both US and USSR cities. Our results show that crisis instability rises slightly as either side alone increases its defense effectiveness, with maximum instability occurring at values of defense effectiveness approximating 80%. After that point, crisis stability increases until the situation can be regarded as more stable than it was initially. Our results also show that when both superpowers increase their defense effectiveness simultaneously, crisis instability reaches a maximum at the same time mutual deterrence begins to decrease. These findings cast doubt on the wisdom of sharing strategic defense technology.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 7156764
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-53743; ON: DE87005728
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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350100* -- Arms Control-- Policy
Negotiations
& Legislation-- (1987-)
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ASIA
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPE
GAME THEORY
MATHEMATICS
NATIONAL DEFENSE
NORTH AMERICA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STABILITY
STATISTICS
USA
USSR
WARFARE
WEAPONS