Exchange simulation and crisis stability

Technical Report · Mon Oct 15 04:00:00 EDT 1984

OSTI ID:5981558

Reinhardt, G C

We have extended our studies of optimal strategies for nuclear exchanges to include the question of stability under crisis. Using a transparent, but effective algorithm we discuss ways in which a superpower exchange can be examined as strategic force postures change on the two sides. Results can be applied to determine how variations in force structures benefit or harm both sides, and this in turn allows a comparison of the degree of crisis stability descriptive of a given base scenario and variations to it. The simplicity of the model obviates the need for extensive computational support, allowing most researchers to make quantitative studies of stability. Application of this way of thinking to scenarios similar to that existing in the present US-USSR confrontation leads to a rather intuitive result: strategic strike forces which are vulnerable to prevenient (preemptive) attack by the opponent do not enhance crisis stability. What is rather less intuitive is the observation that crisis stability does not necessarily degrade when force deployments made by one side benefit that side at the expense of the opponent. This is particularly relevant in the case of improvements made by the weaker side. The examples used underline the difference between crisis stability and the commonly accepted meaning of deterrence. Most would agree that even though deterrence exists, a desirable degree of stability does not.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 5981558
• Report Number(s): UCRL-53585; ON: DE85008932
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
450200 -- Military Technology
Weaponry
& National Defense-- Nuclear Explosions & Explosives
990500* -- Civilian Defense-- (-1987)
AVOIDANCE
BEHAVIOR
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
NATIONAL DEFENSE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STABILITY
WARFARE
WEAPONS