START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) and stability
In this study, which extends our investigations of prevenient stability, we examine the effects of strategic arms reductions such as those proposed in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). We use exchange models and the theory of prevenient stability to look at the changes in crisis stability and deterrence that would be brought about by future cuts in the strategic nuclear forces of the US and the USSR. Our analysis includes strategic defenses and hypothetical technological breakthroughs. Our results indicate that, if force vulnerabilities exist on either side, arms reductions would erode deterrence -- the greater the degree of vulnerability, the greater the effect. Defense of strategic strike forces, if perfected, would improve deterrence and increase crisis stability. Otherwise, it is clear that prevenient stability, as explicitly defined herein, would be decreased. 9 refs., 3 figs., 7 tabs.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/DP
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 6884784
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-LR-103710; ON: DE90016650
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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