Nuclear employment policy and optimal exchange strategies

Technical Report · Sun Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 1991

OSTI ID:10170799

Reinhardt, G C

This paper investigates the implications of strategic force reductions on stability using some US force postures suggested by Leon Sloss. Previous work has indicated that if force vulnerabilities exist, arms reduction can erode prevenient stability. This same conclusion applies here. The possible cost of non-optimal strategic weapons employment options was also studied by comparing analytically the outcome of optimal strategic exchanges as computed by the EXCHANGE code with selected limited strike options and their results. The analysis raises doubt as to the utility of less-than-optimal nuclear options if strategic forces are vulnerable.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 10170799
• Report Number(s): UCRL-ID--109684; ON: DE92040426
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

350200
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
E CODES
MILITARY STRATEGY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
STABILITY
VULNERABILITY