Disposition scenarios and safeguardability of fissile materials under START Treaty
Conference
·
· Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (United States)
OSTI ID:6846372
- Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)
Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) signed in 1991 and the Lisbon Protocol of 1992, a large inventory of fissile materials will be removed from the weapons fuel cycles of the United States and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The Lisbon Protocol calls for Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Byelarus to become nonnuclear members of the treaty and for Russia to assume the responsibility of the treaty as a nuclear weapons state. In addition, the START-II Treaty, which was signed in 1993 by the United States and Russia, further reduces deployed nuclear warheads and adds to the inventory of excess special nuclear materials (SNM). Because storage of in-tact warheads has the potential for a [open quotes]breakout,[close quotes] it would be desirable to dismantle the warheads and properly dispose of the SNMs under appropriate safeguards to prevent their reentry into the weapons fuel cycle. The SNM recovered from dismantled warheads can be disposed of in several ways, and the final choices may be up to the country having the title to the SNM. Current plans are to store them indefinitely, leaving serious safeguards concerns. Recognizing that the underlying objective of these treaties is to prevent the fissile materials from reentering the weapons fuel cycle, it is necessary to establish a verifiable disposal scheme that includes safeguards requirements. This paper identifies some realistic scenarios for the disposal of SNM from the weapons fuel cycle and examines the safeguardability of those scenarios.
- OSTI ID:
- 6846372
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-931160--
- Conference Information:
- Journal Name: Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (United States) Journal Volume: 69
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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