Skip to main content
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Application of safeguards technologies in support of a bilateral treaty to reduce nuclear warheads

Conference · · Nuclear Materials Management. Annual Meeting Proceedings; (United States)
OSTI ID:5503181
 [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)
The recently concluded Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START){asterisk} between the US and the USSR is likely to lead to a reduction in the number of deployable warheads and delivery systems. One way of maintaining stability under this regime could be to control fissile materials within the defense complex of the parties involved and to assure separation of commercial and defense fuel cycles. A verifiable production scheme and a stable fissile material inventory can prevent a breakout and its consequences. Some of the well-established principles and practices of nuclear material safeguards can be brought to bear on this problem and help maintain a stable inventory of nuclear materials and indirectly a limit on the number of warheads. For the purpose of discussion, this paper assumes a treaty regime wherein a large number of deployed warheads will be dismantled under supervision and the disposal of recovered nuclear materials will be in a verifiable regime so that they may not reenter the weapons fuel cycle. This paper examines a pragmatic scenario for dismantling warheads so that the declared special nuclear material contents can be verified without compromising design information.
OSTI ID:
5503181
Report Number(s):
CONF-910774--
Conference Information:
Journal Name: Nuclear Materials Management. Annual Meeting Proceedings; (United States) Journal Volume: 20
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English