Warheads and Fissile Materials:Declarations and Counting
This paper reviews some of the issues about verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads and controlling nuclear materials in the context of arms control objectives. It is asserted that information about the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and materials is necessary to analyze the impacts and verification requirements of arms control measures including warhead dismantlement and fissile material controls. It is proposed that the US and the Soviets engage in a series of declarations about their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials. It is also asserted that currently it is more important to verify that warheads are retired to safe, secure facilities than to verify their dismantlement. It is proposed that production of new or rebuilt warheads be limited to less than the number retired each year. Verifying the number of new and rebuilt warheads deployed and the number retired avoids many of the difficulties in verifying dismantlement and material controls.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA (US), Center for Technical Studies on Security, Energy, and Arms Control (US)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- US Department of Energy (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 822694
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-JC-108073; CONF-911106--85; CTS--27-91
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
FISSILE MATERIALS
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
POLITICAL ASPECTS
PRODUCTION
STOCKPILES
VERIFICATION
WEAPONS