Alternative interpretations of TTBT (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring effectiveness
The eventual submission of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT) for ratification and the implementation of the enhanced verification provided for by the treaty will force policy makers to address many important verification issues. Many of these issues are directly linked to judgments about the effectiveness of the US system for monitoring Soviet compliance. Examples include: which verification measures to deploy for each Soviet test: how to combine the monitoring data from different verification measures; how to respond to the monitoring data; and, particularly relevant to the ratification process, what is the level of monitoring effectiveness provided by the enhanced verification. Perhaps the two measures that best characterize monitoring effectiveness are: the probability of not detecting (i.e., missing) a militarily significant Soviet violation should the Soviets evade the treaty; and the probability that the US will believe that the Soviets are violating the threshold when they are actually complying (i. e., a false alarm). These probabilities of missing a violation and of false alarm are not themselves basic measurements. They are derived by a set of calculations. While these calculations were never simple nor wholly uncontroversial, the enhanced verification provided by the treaty and the ratification process will likely bring them under additional scrutiny. In this report, several approaches to determining TTBT monitoring effectiveness using the probabilities of a missed violation and false alarm are presented. The different approaches are presented in order of increasing complexity, and the pros and cons of each approach are discussed.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/DP
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 6732213
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-ID-104105; ON: DE90014722
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS//MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE
TREATIES
MONITORING
VERIFICATION
COMPLIANCE
DATA COVARIANCES
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
PROBABILITY
VIOLATIONS
350300* - Arms Control- Verification- (1987-)
990200 - Mathematics & Computers
350101 - Arms Control- Policy
Negotiations
& Legislation- Treaties- (1987-)