A computer model for analyzing low-yield threshold test ban treaties

Technical Report · Thu Nov 01 04:00:00 EST 1990

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/6337102· OSTI ID:6337102

Bradford, R M; Sokkappa, P R

With the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), there has been increased interest in lowering the nuclear test ban threshold from its present level of 150 kilotons and much debate about what this lower threshold should be. The uncertainties associated with verifying the TTBT, along with the added difficulties associated with lower yields, have aroused concern that a Low-Yield Threshold Test Ban Treaty (LYTTBT) may not be sufficiently verifiable. This report documents a computer model for analyzing the verifiability of LYTTBT options. The model systematically accounts for the uncertainty inherent in the treaty verification process. It helps the user gain insights into the interactions among monitoring capability, beliefs about Soviet testing strategies, and the likelihood of missing violations or making false accusations of violations. The model can also account for possible Soviet evasion strategies that could systematically reduce the US estimates of Soviet test yields. There are eight components of the model, each facilitating a different type of analysis. The components are: cavity decoupling, verification effectiveness, probability of missed violation, probability of false accusation, detectable violation, distinguishable yield, required monitoring capability and expected utility. The next six components address the verifiability of alternate LYTTBTs from different perspectives. Finally, the Expected Utility component computes the expected overall utility of each threshold option. Decision makers can use the various components of the model to study issues related to the verifiability of various LYTTBT options. Because the model is explicit and quantitative, it provides decision makers with rational, defensible analyses, which can be used as input when making important treaty and verification decisions. 2 refs. 5 figs.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
• Sponsoring Organization: DOE/DP
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 6337102
• Report Number(s): UCRL-ID-105666; ON: DE91006222
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

350300* -- Arms Control-- Verification-- (1987-)
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS
990200 -- Mathematics & Computers
COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
EXPLOSIONS
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
SIMULATION
TREATIES
VERIFICATION