Evaluating arms control treaty verification regimes: A risk analysis approach
Conference
·
OSTI ID:6453409
We develop a quantitative risk analysis methodology to evaluate verification measures for a bilateral arms control treaty. The methodology is designed to accomplish an integrated evaluation of the total adversary evasion potential and the complete verification regime while considering the interaction among different verification measures. The method uses a network or a fault tree to: identify potential weaknesses in the overall treaty verification system; highlight the evasion and breakout strategies least likely to be detected or deterred; and to determine the individual verification measures that offer the greatest benefit. 3 figs.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/DP
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 6453409
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-JC-104584; CONF-910213--9; ON: DE90017523
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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