Deterrence of arms control treaty evasion by suspect site inspections
Deterrence of evasions is an important benefit of arms control treaty verification measures in general, and suspect site inspections in particular. In this report, we present an analytical framework for evaluating the deterrence effect of verification measures and discuss the framework in the context of suspect site inspections. The framework incorporates the effects of verification measures on both the probabilities of detection and the evader's values of evasion. 6 refs., 13 figs.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/DP
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 7009009
- Report Number(s):
- UCID-21818; ON: DE90008037
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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