A network methodology for evaluation of treaty verification options
In this report, we develop a quantitative methodology using network theory to evaluate verification measures for a bilateral arms control treaty. The methodology is designed to accomplish an integrated evaluation of the total Soviet evasion potential and the complete verification regime while considering the interaction among different verification measures. The method can be used to identify potential weaknesses in the overall treaty verification system, to highlight the evasion and breakout strategies least likely to be detected or deterred, and to determine the individual verification measures that offer the greatest benefit. The methodology is demonstrated using a hypothetical example of verification of limits on small single-stage ballistic missiles under a hypothetical treaty. 12 figs., 2 tabs.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/DP
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 5167943
- Report Number(s):
- UCID-21817; ON: DE90004487
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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ALGORITHMS
ARMS CONTROL
ASIA
DATA ACQUISITION
DATA PROCESSING
DESIGN
DETECTION
DIAGRAMS
EASTERN EUROPE
ENGINEERING DRAWINGS
EUROPE
IMPLEMENTATION
INSPECTION
MANUFACTURING
MAPPING
MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
MEASURING METHODS
MILITARY STRATEGY
MISSILES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PLANNING
PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION
PROCESSING
STATISTICAL MODELS
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
TOPOLOGICAL MAPPING
TRANSFORMATIONS
USSR
VERIFICATION
VIOLATIONS
WEAPONS