Using detection and deterrence to reduce insider risk

Conference · Fri Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1988 · Nucl. Mater. Manage. Annu. Meet. Proc.; (United States)

OSTI ID:6120508

Eggers, R F; Carlson, R L; Udell, C J

This paper addresses a new concept of interaction between adversary detection and deterrence. It provides an initial evaluation of the effects of these variables on the risk of theft of special nuclear material by an insider adversary and can be extended to the sabotage threat. A steady-state risk equation is used. Exercises with this equation show that deterrence, resulting from the prospect of detection, has a greater ability to reduce the risk than the detection exercise itself. This is true for all cases except those in which the probabilty of detection is 1. Cases were developed for three different types of adversaries that can be distinguished from one another by the level of detection they are willing to tolerate before they are deterred from attempting a theft. By considering the effects of detection, deterrence, and adversary type, the ground work is laid for designing cost-effective insider threat-protection systems.

• Research Organization: Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (US)
• OSTI ID: 6120508
• Report Number(s): CONF-880631-
• Conference Information: Journal Name: Nucl. Mater. Manage. Annu. Meet. Proc.; (United States) Journal Volume: 17
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055000* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability
42 ENGINEERING
420202 -- Engineering-- Protective Structures & Equipment
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ADVERSARIES
ALARM SYSTEMS
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
DESIGN
EVALUATION
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
MINIMIZATION
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
RISK ASSESSMENT
SABOTAGE