Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation
- ORNL
The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with compensating mitigation can decrease the risk of an insider performing a malicious act without detection.
- Research Organization:
- Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC05-00OR22725
- OSTI ID:
- 1016056
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 10th Central Asia MC&A Conference, Astana, Kazakhstan, 20110516, 20110520
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
DETECTION
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
MITIGATION
NATIONAL SECURITY
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PERSONNEL
PHYSICAL PROTECTION
PLUTONIUM
REMOVAL
SABOTAGE
SAFEGUARDS
SAFETY
SECURITY
THEFT