Using detection and deterrence to reduce insider risk

Conference · Wed Jun 01 04:00:00 EDT 1988

OSTI ID:6879998

Eggers, R F; Carlson, R L; Udell, C J

This paper addresses a new concept of interaction between adversary detection and deterrence. It provides an initial evaluation of the effects of these variables on the risk of theft of special nuclear material by an insider adversary and can be extended to the sabotage threat. A steady-state risk equation is used. Exercises with this equation show that deterrence, resulting from the prospect of detection, has a greater ability to reduce the risk than the detection exercise itself. This is true for all cases except those in which the probability of detection is 1. Cases were developed for three different types of adversaries that can be distinguished from one another by the level of detection they are willing to tolerate before they are deterred from attempting a theft. By considering the effects of detection, deterrence, and adversary type, the ground work is laid for designing cost-effective insider threat-protection systems. 2 refs., 6 figs.

• Research Organization: Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (USA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC06-87RL10930
• OSTI ID: 6879998
• Report Number(s): WHC-SA-0261; CONF-880631-55; ON: DE89000512
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055000* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
CRIME
MANAGEMENT
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PROBABILITY
RISK ASSESSMENT
SABOTAGE
SAFEGUARDS
THEFT