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U.S. Department of Energy
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Regulatory politics and electric utilities: a case study in political economy

Book ·
OSTI ID:5813748
Anderson's stated purpose in writing this book was to take a fresh look at regulatory behavior by focusing on the state regulation of electric utilities from 1968 to 1978. To this end, the first chapter is a conceptional framework that is structured to include both external constraints placed on the regulatory agency and the internal dynamics of regulatory bureaucracy. The idea is that regulators are constrained by both the political interest of external groups, utilties, and electricity customers, and the level of staff cooperation. Where a point decision is involved, the necessity of staff cooperation is lessened due to the yes-no nature of the decision. However, when faced with a planning task the regulator must be aware of the level of staff cooperation due to the requirements of continued staff participation. Additionally, the regulator faced varying stringency of external constraints. The analysis is concerned with the relationship between the internal and external constraints and the resulting regulatory decision. Chapters 2 and 3 are historical review chapters. The first deals with the origins of state utility regulation. The second is an investigation of recent structural changes in the regulation of electric utilities. Chapters 4 and 5 consist of two case studies of state regulation of public utilities in New York and California. The final chapter draws a summary and general conclusions. The reviewer feels that, in summary, although Anderson's analysis is sound it fails to build upon the existing literature; and, in fact, denies the applicability of these models to the approach employed. This, he notes, led the author to restructure these arguments - albeit not as formally as the original authors.
OSTI ID:
5813748
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English