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Political economy of the utility rate-making process

Book ·
OSTI ID:6158554
Research is reported that characterizes the political economy of the rate-making process in terms of distinct interest groups, empirically tests the incentives motivating these groups, and quantifies the groups' influence on public-utility commissioners' decisions to grant or deny requested increases in electric-utility revenues. The theory developed is an extension of earlier work performed by Mark Crain and Robert McCormick. Its theoretical basis resides in public choice and regulatory economics. In the tradition of public-choice thought, the commissioners' utility function is modeled to determine the political as well as economic-efficiency variables influencing the commissioners' decision. The rate-making process is modeled as a system for four distinct interest groups - commission members, commission staff, producers (regulated utilities), and consumers (ratepayers) - competing for the wealth transfers emanating from the rate-making process. An ordinary least-squares regression analysis was performed for each of the 4 interest groups. Statistically significant political and economic influences are exerted by the consumer group in determining the budget appropriated to the regulatory commission. The producer group and the commission itself are also influential in determining commission budget. Likewise, the commission staff's influence on the commission decision is assumed to be a function of the size of the commission staff.
Research Organization:
George Mason Univ., Fairfax, VA (USA)
OSTI ID:
6158554
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English