Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention
On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed {open_quotes}... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as {open_quotes}the Cutoff Convention{close_quotes}) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced after entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. {open_quotes}Production{close_quotes} would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards.
- Research Organization:
- Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC02-76CH00016
- OSTI ID:
- 434426
- Report Number(s):
- BNL--63744; SSN--96-14; ON: DE97002847
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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