Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise

doi:https://doi.org/10.2172/105699

Title: Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise

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Abstract

In a September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton announced a new nonproliferation and export control policy that established a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new policy proposed that the US undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material. One of the key elements was for the US to support a special nuclear materials (SNM) multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards. This policy is often referred to as the President`s Cutoff Initiative or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Because both the US Department of Energy (DOE) and foreign reprocessing facilities similar to PUREX will likely to be inspected under a FMCT, the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Negotiations and Analysis Division (DOE/NN-41) tasked Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to perform an information gathering exercise, the PUREX Exercise, using the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant located on the Hanford Site in Washington State. PUREX is a former production reactor fuel reprocessing plant currently undergoing a transition to a ``decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) ready`` mode. The PUREX Exercise was conductedmore »« less

Authors:

Libby, R A; Davis, C ^[1]; Segal, J E; Stanbro, W D ^[2]

Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)
Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

Publication Date:: 1995-08-01

Research Org.:: Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)

OSTI Identifier:: 105699

Report Number(s):: PNL-10705-Vol.1
ON: DE95017593; TRN: 95:020577

DOE Contract Number:: AC06-76RL01830

Resource Type:: Technical Report

Resource Relation:: Other Information: PBD: Aug 1995

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 05 NUCLEAR FUELS; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; PUREX PROCESS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT; NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY; HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM; PLUTONIUM; INSPECTION

Citation Formats


                    Libby, R A, Davis, C, Segal, J E, and Stanbro, W D. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise.  United States: N. p., 1995. 
        Web.  doi:10.2172/105699.

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                    Libby, R A, Davis, C, Segal, J E, & Stanbro, W D. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise.  United States.  https://doi.org/10.2172/105699

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                    Libby, R A, Davis, C, Segal, J E, and Stanbro, W D. Tue .  
        "Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise".  United States.  https://doi.org/10.2172/105699.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/105699.

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@article{osti_105699,

  title        = {Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise},

  author       = {Libby, R A and Davis, C and Segal, J E and Stanbro, W D},

  abstractNote = {In a September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton announced a new nonproliferation and export control policy that established a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new policy proposed that the US undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material. One of the key elements was for the US to support a special nuclear materials (SNM) multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards. This policy is often referred to as the President`s Cutoff Initiative or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Because both the US Department of Energy (DOE) and foreign reprocessing facilities similar to PUREX will likely to be inspected under a FMCT, the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Negotiations and Analysis Division (DOE/NN-41) tasked Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to perform an information gathering exercise, the PUREX Exercise, using the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant located on the Hanford Site in Washington State. PUREX is a former production reactor fuel reprocessing plant currently undergoing a transition to a ``decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) ready`` mode. The PUREX Exercise was conducted March 29--30, 1994, to examine aspects of the imposition of several possible cutoff regimes and to study verification of non-production of SNM for nuclear weapons purposes or outside of safeguards. A follow-up activity to further examine various additional verification regimes was held at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) on May 10, 1994.},

  doi          = {10.2172/105699},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/105699},
  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {1995},

  month        = {8}

}

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