Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
- Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 221 Nassau St., 2nd floor, Princeton, NJ 08542 (United States)
A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.
- OSTI ID:
- 22280429
- Journal Information:
- AIP Conference Proceedings, Journal Name: AIP Conference Proceedings Journal Issue: 1 Vol. 1596; ISSN 0094-243X; ISSN APCPCS
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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