Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
- Princeton Univ., NJ (United States). Program on Science and Global Security; Princeton University
A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material – in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium – for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international – most likely International Atomic Energy Agency – monitoring. There are many non-weapon states that argue the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. Our paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.
- Research Organization:
- Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- Grant/Contract Number:
- NA0002534
- OSTI ID:
- 1367679
- Alternate ID(s):
- OSTI ID: 22280429
- Journal Information:
- AIP Conference Proceedings, Journal Name: AIP Conference Proceedings Vol. 200; ISSN 0094-243X
- Publisher:
- American Institute of Physics (AIP)Copyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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