Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

Journal Article · Wed Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2014 · AIP Conference Proceedings

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1063/1.4876470· OSTI ID:1367679

von Hippel, Frank N. ^[1]

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1. Princeton Univ., NJ (United States). Program on Science and Global Security; Princeton University

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material – in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium – for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international – most likely International Atomic Energy Agency – monitoring. There are many non-weapon states that argue the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. Our paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.

• Research Organization: Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• Grant/Contract Number: NA0002534
• OSTI ID: 1367679
• Alternate ID(s): OSTI ID: 22280429
• Journal Information: AIP Conference Proceedings, Journal Name: AIP Conference Proceedings Vol. 200; ISSN 0094-243X
• Publisher: American Institute of Physics (AIP)
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION