Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game

Conference · Sat Sep 01 04:00:00 EDT 2018 · 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan (SICE)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.23919/sice.2018.8492699· OSTI ID:1821661

Yoshihara, Miyu ^[1]; Namerikawa, Toru; Qu, Zhihua

---

1. University of central Florida

In this paper, we deal with the charging scheduling optimization problem of electric vehicle using Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is one of game theory classified as hierarchical, repeating, and non-cooperative game. The charging station determines the price to maximize its own profit from selling energy and each EV determines the energy demand to maximize the charge benefit by competing with other EVs. At this time, we guarantee that Nash equilibrium exists within the EV group. Finally, using numerical simulation, we show that the game reaches an Stackelberg equilibrium.

• Research Organization: University of central Florida
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE
• DOE Contract Number: EE0007998; EE0007327
• OSTI ID: 1821661
• Conference Information: Journal Name: 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan (SICE)
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English