Two-stage differential game of renewable resources
Thesis/Dissertation
·
OSTI ID:6248417
Harvesting policies for a monopolist guaranteed an initial period of sole ownership of a renewable resource are analyzed. A second producer acts a potential entrant, deciding whether or not to enter the market after the period of monopoly has expired. If entry occurs, the duopoly stage is modeled as a noncooperative differential game. The major objective is to determine the open loop Nash equilibrium strategies for both producers under the assumption that a Stackelberg game is played with the incumbent as leader and the entrant as follower. The solution methodology which guarantees that the equilibrium is subgame perfect begins with the determination of Nash equilibrium policies under the assumption that entry has occurred. Given the solution to the duopoly game, the incumbent maximized his two-stage income, incorporating the optimal response of his potential entrant. This model allows the market structure to change from monopoly to duopoly and assumes the incumbent has the ability to manipulate conditions that affect the entry decision.
- Research Organization:
- Northwestern Univ., Evanston, IL (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6248417
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Generalized Stackelberg feedback solutions for two-stage continuous kernel games
Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game
Deregulation, endogenous expectations and the evolution of industry structure
Conference
·
Fri Dec 30 23:00:00 EST 1994
·
OSTI ID:36303
Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game
Conference
·
Sat Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 2018
· 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan (SICE)
·
OSTI ID:1821661
Deregulation, endogenous expectations and the evolution of industry structure
Journal Article
·
Mon Dec 31 23:00:00 EST 1984
· South. Econ. J.; (United States)
·
OSTI ID:5962643