Diversity for Microelectronics Lifecycle Security
- Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
- Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
In this work we examine approaches for using implementation diversity to disrupt or disable hardware trojans. We explore a variety of general frameworks for building diverse variants of circuits in voting architectures, and examine the impact of these on attackers and defenders mathematically and empirically. This work is augmented by analysis of a new majority voting technique. We also describe several automated approaches for generating diverse variants of a circuit and empirically study the overheads associated with these. We then describe a general technique for targeting functional circuit modifications to hardware trojans, present several specific implementations of this technique, and study the impact that they have on trojanized benchmark circuits.
- Research Organization:
- Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC04-94AL85000; NA0003525
- OSTI ID:
- 1760404
- Report Number(s):
- SAND--2018-11010; 668556
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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