Malicious modifications to printed circuit boards (PCBs) are known as hardware Trojans. These may arise when malafide third parties alter PCBs premanufacturing or postmanufacturing and are a concern in safety-critical applications, such as industrial control systems. In this research, we examine how data-driven detection can be utilized to detect such Trojans at run-time. We develop a flexible and reconfigurable PCB test bed derived from the popular open-source programmable logic controller (PLC) platform “OpenPLC.” We then develop a Trojan detection framework, which utilizes and analyzes multimodal side channels (e.g., timing, magnetic signals, power, and hardware performance counters). We consider defender-configurable input/output (I/O) loopback test, comparison with design-document baselines, and magnetometer-aided monitoring of system behavior under defender-chosen excitations. Our approach can extend to golden-free environments. Golden (known-good) versions of the PCBs are assumed not available, but design information, datasheets, and component-level data are available. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on a range of Trojans instantiated in the test bed.
Pearce, Hammond, et al. "Detecting Hardware Trojans in PCBs Using Side Channel Loopbacks." IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 30, no. 7, Jul. 2022. https://doi.org/10.1109/tvlsi.2022.3171174
Pearce, Hammond, Surabhi, Virinchi Roy, Krishnamurthy, Prashanth, et al., "Detecting Hardware Trojans in PCBs Using Side Channel Loopbacks," IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems 30, no. 7 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1109/tvlsi.2022.3171174
@article{osti_1877019,
author = {Pearce, Hammond and Surabhi, Virinchi Roy and Krishnamurthy, Prashanth and Trujillo, Joshua and Karri, Ramesh and Khorrami, Farshad},
title = {Detecting Hardware Trojans in PCBs Using Side Channel Loopbacks},
annote = {Malicious modifications to printed circuit boards (PCBs) are known as hardware Trojans. These may arise when malafide third parties alter PCBs premanufacturing or postmanufacturing and are a concern in safety-critical applications, such as industrial control systems. In this research, we examine how data-driven detection can be utilized to detect such Trojans at run-time. We develop a flexible and reconfigurable PCB test bed derived from the popular open-source programmable logic controller (PLC) platform “OpenPLC.” We then develop a Trojan detection framework, which utilizes and analyzes multimodal side channels (e.g., timing, magnetic signals, power, and hardware performance counters). We consider defender-configurable input/output (I/O) loopback test, comparison with design-document baselines, and magnetometer-aided monitoring of system behavior under defender-chosen excitations. Our approach can extend to golden-free environments. Golden (known-good) versions of the PCBs are assumed not available, but design information, datasheets, and component-level data are available. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on a range of Trojans instantiated in the test bed.},
doi = {10.1109/tvlsi.2022.3171174},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1877019},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems},
issn = {ISSN 1063-8210},
number = {7},
volume = {30},
place = {United States},
publisher = {IEEE},
year = {2022},
month = {07}}
Kansas City Nuclear Security Campus (KCNSC), Kansas City, MO (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Grant/Contract Number:
NA0002839
OSTI ID:
1877019
Report Number(s):
NSC-614-4221; DE-NA0002839
Journal Information:
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, Journal Name: IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems Journal Issue: 7 Vol. 30; ISSN 1063-8210
2010 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems - ISCAS 2010, Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systemshttps://doi.org/10.1109/ISCAS.2010.5537869
CCS'14: 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Securityhttps://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660309
CCS'15: The 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Proceedings of the Second ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defensehttps://doi.org/10.1145/2808475.2808485