Nuclear deterrence in a regional context
Technical Report
·
OSTI ID:107901
This report examines the broad outlines of U.S. strategies of deterring nuclear use by regional adversaries and, when deterrence may be ineffective, for defeating such threats. It represents an application of the concepts contained in a companion document (Watman and Wilkening, 1994), in which the basic ideas underlying deterrence have been reformulated to make them more applicable to regional conflicts. Regional nuclear confrontations will involve brinkmanship, i.e., a competition in risk-taking in which the side that is more risk acceptant and that can credibly make sufficiently devastating threats has the upper hand. Credibility, in turn, is determined by the balance of resolve and the balance of power between the contestants.
- Research Organization:
- Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 107901
- Report Number(s):
- AD-A--286788/5/XAB; RAND/MR--500-A/AF; CNN: Contracts MDA903-91-C-0006, F49620-91-C-0003
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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