A Method for Assessing Effectiveness and Technical Capabilities Required for Integrated Deterrence (NSLP-Final Report-Draft2022)

Technical Report · Wed Sep 01 04:00:00 EDT 2021

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/1860931· OSTI ID:1860931

Boles, Jeremiah ^[1]; Dawson, William ^[1]; Le Galloudec, Korbie ^[1]

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1. Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

The United States faces an ever-increasingly multi-polar security environment dominated by great power competition with China and a lingering Russian threat as well as from would-be regional hegemons led by ambitions from Iran and North Korea. Our adversaries are pursuing and expanding the strategic means by-which they have an asymmetric offset (e.g., cyber, space, and other modes below the level of armed conflict). To combat and deter against the widening range of hostile actions, the U.S. must have additional capabilities with-which to deter. All of which drives us towards a more thoughtful integrated approach to deterrence, attempting to best align deterrent tools with the adversary actions in order to maximize the credibility of our deterrent. Such an approach complicates our deterrence strategy and demands a methodology to assess whether the U.S. has the deterrent tools necessary to deter the adversarial actions most costly to the U.S. To address this complexity, we create a framework to comprehensively and systematically assess our deterrent tools as qualitatively measured against the adversarial actions we wish to deter. Deterrence is ultimately an operation in the cognitive domain and at the heart of the framework presented here is the fundamental deterrence calculus which we use as the defining measure of whether a tool will credibly deter a given action. We describe the eight levers of the deterrence calculus and distill these levers to four products that are used to qualitatively assess the overall effectiveness of deterrence tools against adversarial actions. Credibility is determined by two principal variables: the technical credibility of the deterrent tool, and the principle of proportionality. Technical credibility of realized deterrence products is assessed through development of key mission requirements and hardware (e.g., components) that will impose costs, deny benefits, or encourage restraint. The principle of proportionality qualitatively asserts that for a deterrent tool to be cognitively credible, the costs imposed against, or benefits denied by, an action are commensurate to the magnitude of costs received from the adversarial action. By basing this framework on these two fundamentals, it is possible to compare deterrent tools in a systematic approach across the broad spectrum of hostile actions.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC52-07NA27344
• OSTI ID: 1860931
• Report Number(s): LLNL-TR-833000; 1048570
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

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