Minimum energy efficiency standards for appliances: Old and new economic rationales
- Univ. of Maryland, College Park, MD (United States)
- Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States). Energy Analysis & Environmental Impacts Division
In this study, we revisit Hausman and Joskow (1982)'s economic rationales for appliance minimum energy efficiency standards. In addition to the four market failures they argued could justify appliance standards--energy prices below marginal social cost, consumers underestimating energy prices, consumer discount rates above social discount rates, or principal agent problems--we discuss two additional market failures that are relevant and potentially economically important in this context: market power and innovation market failures. We highlight puzzles uncovered by recent empirical results, and suggest directions future research should take to better understand the normative implications of appliance standards.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), Energy Efficiency Office. Building Technologies Office
- OSTI ID:
- 1344786
- Report Number(s):
- LBNL-1006327; ir:1006327
- Journal Information:
- Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 2; ISSN 2160-5882
- Publisher:
- International Association for Energy EconomicsCopyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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