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Title: Passive Safety Features Evaluation of KIPT Neutron Source Facility

Technical Report ·
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/1330565· OSTI ID:1330565
 [1];  [1]
  1. Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have cooperated on the development, design, and construction of a neutron source facility. The facility was constructed at Kharkov, Ukraine and its commissioning process is underway. It will be used to conduct basic and applied nuclear research, produce medical isotopes, and train young nuclear specialists. The facility has an electron accelerator-driven subcritical assembly. The electron beam power is 100 kW using 100 MeV electrons. Tungsten or natural uranium is the target material for generating neutrons driving the subcritical assembly. The subcritical assembly is composed of WWR-M2 - Russian fuel assemblies with U-235 enrichment of 19.7 wt%, surrounded by beryllium reflector assembles and graphite blocks. The subcritical assembly is seated in a water tank, which is a part of the primary cooling loop. During normal operation, the water coolant operates at room temperature and the total facility power is ~300 KW. The passive safety features of the facility are discussed in in this study. Monte Carlo computer code MCNPX was utilized in the analyses with ENDF/B-VII.0 nuclear data libraries. Negative reactivity temperature feedback was consistently observed, which is important for the facility safety performance. Due to the design of WWR-M2 fuel assemblies, slight water temperature increase and the corresponding water density decrease produce large reactivity drop, which offset the reactivity gain by mistakenly loading an additional fuel assembly. The increase of fuel temperature also causes sufficiently large reactivity decrease. This enhances the facility safety performance because fuel temperature increase provides prompt negative reactivity feedback. The reactivity variation due to an empty fuel position filled by water during the fuel loading process is examined. Also, the loading mistakes of removing beryllium reflector assemblies and replacing them with dummy assemblies were analyzed. In all these circumstances, the reactivity change results do not cause any safety concerns.

Research Organization:
Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
DOE Contract Number:
AC02-06CH11357
OSTI ID:
1330565
Report Number(s):
ANL-16/15; 130640; TRN: US1700449
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English