Changes in Russia's Military and Nuclear Doctrine
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
In 1993, the Russian Federation set out a new military doctrine that would determine the direction of its armed forces until President Putin set out the next doctrine in 2000. The Russian Federation creating the doctrine was new; the USSR had recently collapsed, Gorbachev - the creator of the predecessor to this doctrine in 1987 - was out of office, and the new Russian military had only been formed in May, 1992.1 The analysis of the 1993 doctrine is as follows: a definition of how doctrine is defined; a short history of Russian military doctrine leading up to the 1993 doctrine (officially the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation); and finally, what the doctrine established. An overview of the 1993 doctrine is: (1) Russia's 1993 doctrine was a return to older, more aggressive doctrine as a result of stability concerns surrounding the recent collapse of the USSR; (2) Russia turned from Gorbachev's 'defensive defense' in the 1987 doctrine to aggressive defense with the option of preempting or striking back against an aggressor; (3) Russia was deeply concerned about how nationalism would affect the former Soviet Republics, particularly in respect to the ethnic Russians still living abroad; and (4) Nuclear doctrine pledged to not be the first to use nuclear weapons but provided for the potential for escalation from a conventional to a nuclear war. The 2000 doctrine (officially the Russian Federation Military Doctrine) was created in a more stable world than the 1993 doctrine was. The Russian Federation had survived independence and the 'threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies' had diminished. It had secured all of the nuclear weapons from its neighbors Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and had elected a new president, Vladimir Putin, to replace Boris Yeltsin. Yet, even as the doctrine took more defensive tones than the 1993 doctrine, it expanded its nuclear options. Below are a new definition of what doctrine meant in 2000 and an outline of the 2000 doctrine. An overview of the 2000 doctrine is: (1) The 2000 doctrine was a return to a more defensive posture; the threat of nuclear retaliation, rather than that of preemptive force, would be its deterrence; (2) In order to strengthen its nuclear deterrence, Russia extended and redefined the cases in which nuclear weapons could be used to include a wider range of conflict types and a larger spectrum of attackers; and (3) Russia's threats changed to reflect its latest fear of engaging in a limited conflict with no prospect of the use of nuclear deterrence. In 2006, the defense minister and deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the government was starting on a draft of a future doctrine. Four years later, in 2010, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was put into effect with the intent of determining Russian doctrine until 2020. The 2010 doctrine, like all previous doctrines, was a product of the times in which it was written. Gone were many of the fears that had followed Russia for the past two decades. Below are an examination of the 2010 definition of doctrine as well as a brief analysis of the 2010 doctrine and its deviations from past doctrines. An overview of the 2010 doctrine is: (1) The new doctrine emphasizes the political centralization of command both in military policy and the use of nuclear weapons; (2) Nuclear doctrine remains the same in many aspects including the retention of first-use; (3) At the same time, doctrine was narrowed to using nuclear weapons only when the Russian state's existence is in danger; to continue strong deterrence, Russia also opted to follow the United States by introducing precision conventional weapons; (4) NATO is defined as Russia's primary external threat because of its increased global presence and its attempt to recruit states that are part of the Russian 'bloc'; and (5) The 2000 doctrine's defensive stance was left out of the doctrine; rumored options for use of nuclear weapons in local wars and in preemptive strikes were also left out.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/LANL
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC52-06NA25396
- OSTI ID:
- 1047125
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-12-23486; TRN: US201216%%358
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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