






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
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

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
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**Trends and Challenges in Global Arms Control Regimes:
Implications for the Mediterranean, North Africa
and the Middle East**

Ronald F. Lehman, II

**This paper was prepared for presentation at the International Workshop
"Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Security Cooperation
in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East"
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**Trends and Challenges in Global Arms Control Regimes:
Implications for the Mediterranean, North Africa
and the Middle East**

An address by
Ronald F. Lehman, II, Assistant to the Director
University of California
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, California

For presentation at the international workshop
"Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Security Cooperation
in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East"

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Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:*

The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta, the Henry L. Stimson Center, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta are to be commended for initiating this international workshop on "Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East." You have brought together an impressive array of policy makers and experts, and you have done so when it is most useful. In every direction from Malta, in lands across the Mediterranean, political developments are underway which will have significant security consequences far beyond this region. For that reason, I have come here to learn as much as to contribute. Nevertheless, I have been asked to initiate discussion of current trends and challenges facing global arms control regimes and their implications for Mediterranean, North African and Middle Eastern states.

What defines "global" is, of course, a matter of perspective. For European historians, Malta marks the center of what was once called the "known world." Malta is still at the center of one of the most important regions on the globe, and events on the Mediterranean Sea and in nations nearby have throughout history demonstrated a world-wide impact. Today is no different. And because of the importance of this region, events far away can have major security implications here whether or not they are truly global in their reach. Just as what happens in Russia or China or South Asia or the United States matters here, so developments here are of great importance to nations around the globe.

In another sense, however, the nuclear age and ballistic missiles long ago created a much smaller world in which the distinctions between global and regional security have been lessened. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, any point on the earth can find itself suddenly at the center of world attention. This makes it all the more important that we understand all

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of the arms control tools available, including global approaches. In discussing global arms control regimes, I will focus primarily on those that are open to universal membership such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or which have global reach, such as certain export control and supplier regimes. It is important to remember, however, that certain regional, bilateral, and even unilateral arms control measures can have a global impact as well. One need only witness the impact of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Despite its mere "Atlantic to the Urals" focus, the CFE treaty helped change the political and strategic calculations of the entire world. Likewise, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its headquarters in Vienna, is centered on Europe but spreads from Vancouver to Vladivostok (or perhaps we should say from Amchitka to Kamchatka), circumnavigating much of the northern hemisphere when measured the long way around via North America. The political significance of its successes and failures outdistance CSCE's geographical spread.

Similarly, bilateral agreements such as the START I and START II treaties radically reducing strategic nuclear forces to a small fraction of the levels which once existed have global implications. Large numbers of ballistic missiles with intercontinental range are being eliminated. New standards of transparency and openness have been established. New practices of restraint have been initiated. The draw down in forces has a direct impact here in the Mediterranean.

Unilateral steps taken by the Great Powers have a global application and also an impact here. A decision by President George Bush to remove tactical nuclear weapons from around the globe and to terminate the routine deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, on its ships has been reciprocated as a parallel declaration of policy by Russia. The implications for the Mediterranean littoral are obvious. Of course, not all unilateral developments are positive. Actions by North Korea to ship missiles into the Middle East demonstrates how decisions of nations far away can have a tremendous impact on the stability of vital regions such as those around the Mediterranean. Although not all

approaches to arms control can or should be global, thinking globally is inherent in the process.

The history of arms control has long had a global perspective. From the 1940s to the 1960s, general and complete disarmament dominated discussions at international fora. Such a dramatic approach seemed out of synchronization with the realities of the Cold War and seems only somewhat nearer at hand today when one considers the conflicts raging around the world.

Nevertheless, general and complete disarmament remains an objective codified in the preambles and provisions of several international treaties and recorded even in U.S. domestic law. Although we are well short of general and complete disarmament, an extensive global arms control regime has emerged, particularly for dealing with weapons of mass destruction. A brief overview of regimes in place or awaiting ratification can give one a feeling of the extensive nature of what has been accomplished.

Efforts to ban the use of poisons in war date back to the Middle Ages and perhaps even earlier, but a global approach to preventing the use of poisons as weapons has been a central theme in international disarmament negotiations since the Hague Conventions of the 1890s. Over 140 nations are currently parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of poison gas or bacteriological weapons. In acceding to the Geneva Protocols, most nations reserved the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation to first use by others.

Significantly, a number of nations in the Middle East and North Africa are not parties to the Geneva Protocol. Moreover, it was the use of chemical weapons in this region, most particularly by Iraq which is a party to the Geneva Protocol, which prompted the creation of the Australia Group in 1985, a suppliers export control regime among nations which trade extensively among their chemical industries. Indeed, it was the prospect that chemical weapons might have been even more widely used as a result of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the resulting Gulf War that led to the completion in 1992 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Opened for signature in January 1993, the CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and provides for the destruction of existing stocks. The CWC takes transparency, data exchange, and intrusive inspection to a new frontier. The Convention also establishes a permanent Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and provides for assistance to parties threatened with chemical weapons and for sanctions in the case of violations. The Treaty also would limit trade in chemicals with non-parties.

A similar comprehensive ban on the production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons was concluded in 1972, but this treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) does not provide for the extensive international organization and verification procedures provided for by the CWC. It also has far fewer members. Again, a large number of the nations not party to the Biological Weapons Convention are located in the areas around the Mediterranean.

Given the particularly dangerous and heinous aspects of biological warfare, and taking into account the more extensive verification regimes negotiated for the Chemical Weapons Convention, considerable interest has been expressed in providing verification measures for the BWC. An ad hoc group of government experts (VEREX) was established by the Third Review Conference held in 1991. These experts have reported on a number of possible verification measures which might enhance confidence in compliance with the BWC. The next review conference is scheduled for 1996, but a special conference may well act on measures later this year. Interest in strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention has grown since Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed that the Soviet Union had been conducting an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC for many years.

With 163 states parties, no international arms control treaty is more widely adhered to than the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) signed in 1968. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states agree not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, they are guaranteed

great access to nuclear technology and have codified a commitment from nuclear weapons states to pursue nuclear disarmament.

To provide for verification, parties are required to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor nuclear materials. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 255 passed in 1968, the Security Council and especially its nuclear weapons state permanent members are required to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the U.N. charter if a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT is under threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. To further strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, the convention on physical protection of nuclear material was concluded in March of 1980, and provides mandatory international standards for the security of international transit of certain nuclear materials.

In the nuclear area, the global approach has gone beyond the surface of the earth. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) prohibits nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water and has approximately 120 parties. About a hundred nations have also signed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibiting the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction around the earth or the stationing of such weapons on the moon or elsewhere in outer space. Nearly as many nations have signed the 1971 Sea-bed Treaty which prohibits placement of nuclear weapons on seabeds or the ocean floor beyond a twelve mile territorial zone.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which provides for the demilitarization of that polar continent and which provides for extensive inspections of activities conducted there, has 42 members from around the globe. Even existing regional nuclear-weapons-free zones, such as Latin America's 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific's 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, have protocols under which the nuclear weapons states and some others undertake obligations to respect their zones.

Regional arms control regimes and processes with limited membership can also have a global impact. I've mentioned the Treaty on Conventional Forces

in Europe and CSCE process which are even more important in this region because much of the northern edge of the Mediterranean is formed by nations which are parties to the CSCE agreement.

One can see the interaction between global and regional arms control in the arms control and regional security working group which has been established as part of the Middle East peace process. It is hosted by the United States and Russia, but in addition to the Israeli and Arab participants, observers from interested nations outside the region also participate.

Bilateral regimes can also have a global impact. For example, the U.S.-Soviet Incidence at Sea Agreement has for many years provided a private consultative process to reduce the chances of military confrontation as a result of accident or miscalculation on the high seas. The implications in this region are also obvious. Bilateral regimes have even served as precursors for global approaches. For example, in 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the Bilateral Chemical Weapons Exchange Agreement in order to provide a firmer foundation for the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons. Taking this approach one step further, in 1990 the two sides concluded a bilateral chemical weapons destruction agreement to add further momentum to efforts to conclude a global Chemical Weapons Convention.

In looking at the implications of global arms control developments for enhancing security and the peace process in the Mediterranean region, it is important to recognize that a number of global organizations play an important role. I have already mentioned the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, but it is important to recognize also the important role of the United Nations and its affiliated organizations. Of course, the Security Council is playing an increasingly central role in arms control enforcement and established the U.N. Special Commission which, with the IAEA, helps monitor compliance with U.N. resolutions in Iraq.

The General Assembly has played an important role in obtaining more universal participation in global arms control regimes. It considers annual reports from the IAEA and through its First Committee and Disarmament Commission puts a spotlight on global and regional arms control priorities.

Global regimes I have described thus far are often said to deal with the demand for weapons and weapons related technology. Traditionally, parties to the treaty have sought the widest possible adherence. There are also a number of global regimes which deal with the supply side of the equation. Here membership has tended to be limited.

The Australia group has sought to help prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons by educating industry and rationalizing national export control laws around the world. It provides greater transparency and increased ability to intervene in cases where shipments of sensitive technologies or materials are destined for potential proliferators. Some fifty dual use chemicals are controlled, along with certain dual use equipment.

A similarly informal regime was established in 1987 to deal with the threat of ballistic missiles, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Members of the regime have agreed to control rocket and unmanned air delivery systems which can go 300 kilometers with a 500 kilogram payload. Certain missile related technologies and materials are also controlled.

The grandfather of supplier control regimes was the Zangger Committee, established in 1971 to advise the IAEA on certain nuclear materials, and equipment for dealing with them, which should be monitored by IAEA safeguards. In 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established with essentially the same membership but its mandate and scope has evolved considerably. NSG guidelines now require full scope safeguards on all nuclear activities as a condition for any supply of source and special fissionable materials. The NSG has also promulgated guidelines for the transfer of nuclear related dual use equipment and material.

Most of these suppliers groups are made up of about twenty-five of the same advanced industrial nations. Because supplier technology has spread and because some barriers to cooperation among more diverse nations have been reduced, increased consideration has been given to expanding their membership. Recently, for example, Argentina and Ukraine had attended meetings of the NSG as observers.

Thus far, I have focused on global regimes dealing primarily with weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Over the years a number of efforts have been made to manage Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT). In 1992 the United Nations established a register of conventional arms, a voluntary process whereby member states supply data on the exports and imports of major weapons systems and provide general information on equipment levels and production. Over 80 nations have submitted data, and a panel of government experts will convene later in the year to review the possibility of improvements. Participation in the U.N. register of conventional arms has been much more extensive than participation in the U.N. developed instrument for standardized international reporting of military expenditures where fewer than 40 nations have reported to the U.N. General Assembly on their military budgets.

On the supply side, and in a regional context, the five major arms suppliers to the Middle East; namely, the U.S., China, France, and the U.K. and Russia, agreed in October of 1991 to common guidelines on the export of conventional arms, again with important implications for this region. Agreement was not reached, however, on the question of prior notification of sales.

This overview of global arms control regimes and more limited regimes with global impact, however cursory, gives us a measure of how far global regimes and regimes with global reach have advanced, but also gives us an understanding of what global regimes have not been able to address. It can also make clear where they are in danger of falling short of their objectives.

Global, regional, and bilateral arms control agreements have given nations more experience, new concepts, and improved institutions for applying arms control tools to security and diplomatic problems. Implementation of the START I and START II treaties will for many years continue to result in the actual reduction of strategic nuclear delivery systems with global reach. The scope of arms control activity has been expanded beyond weapons of mass destruction..

Not all developments, however, have been positive. As we get closer to universal participation in global regimes, it is becoming more and more difficult to persuade the last few nations of interest to join. Indeed, worse, as in the case with North Korea, difficulty in enforcing compliance further undermines efforts to codify an international norm. It remains to be seen whether the framework of global arms control agreements can long survive efforts by some inside and outside the treaties to keep the regimes weak. Certainly the euphoria for international collective action which followed the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War has been dashed by developments in Bosnia, Somalia, and Korea. The international community most supportive of global approaches to arms control has come face to face with the regional and sectarian complexities and dangers for which broad-brush approaches are often least relevant.

It is often said that nuclear war was unlikely, but the consequences were beyond human imagination, and thus nuclear disarmament deserved our highest priority. The corollary to that was that although regional and sectarian violence was frequent, the consequences were less severe. Today's world is revealing that the price in human suffering of local conflicts is great and the risk that advanced weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, might increase the carnage makes the fear even greater. For many regions, global applications can establish a baseline at best. In some cases, global approaches are not yet ripe for application and in other areas they may be inadequate or even counterproductive.

Regional complexities are not the only obstacles which have emerged to global approaches. Although technology offers the prospects for improved

verification and greater transparency, the inevitable spread of dual use technology makes it difficult to keep pace with the threats the global regimes were designed to limit. Also, as the effective implementation of global regimes becomes more tedious, more expensive, more painful, and less glamorous, interest in addressing the highest priority international security issues may wane. This does not mean that preference for global approaches will necessarily decline. In some cases, it may mean that globalization of issues may become increasingly attractive as a way for nations to avoid dealing with difficult regional or domestic problems. Frankly, global approaches to arms control at large, by which I mean to include both confidence building and nonproliferation, face a number of important challenges. How global regimes deal with these challenges will be important to nations in this region, whether they are parties in good standing or not.

Perhaps the most significant challenge to global approaches to arms control today is keeping what has already been achieved. UNSCOM inspections revealed in Iraq how a nation party to the NPT could still come very close to achieving nuclear weapons. In the Iraqi case, the most intrusive arms control compliance regime ever established has been imposed, but we must remember that it is the product of Iraq's defeat in war. The viability of the long term monitoring program in Iraq years from now is uncertain.

Perhaps a greater compliance challenge to global agreements involves the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). When implementation of IAEA Safeguards agreements revealed discrepancies in North Korean data and when negotiation of challenge inspection provisions for the Korean peninsula denuclearization agreement and prospects for special inspections by the IAEA threatened to reveal the extent of its covert nuclear weapons program, Pyongyang announced it would withdraw from the NPT and later the IAEA. The drama continues today.

Here I would simply like to emphasize two points on global aspects of the Korean situation and a third point on regional approaches. First, this is not a bilateral dispute between North Korea and either the United States or South Korea. The treaty North Korea is violating has some 160 other parties. The

IAEA is an international organization with members and inspectors from many nations. The major military command in Korea is a United Nations Command. My point is that global approaches will be of limited value in particularly troubled regions if they do not get global support. Second, when Pyongyang threatened to withdraw from the NPT, many commentators reacted as if withdrawal would relieve North Korea of its obligations. Legally, the North cannot escape the consequences of its violations by invoking the withdrawal clause, but the failure to insist that North Korea undo its violations whether it remains a party or not will turn the NPT into a fast track to nuclear proliferation of ever more limited value, particularly as, in the years ahead, more and more countries have the knowledge, technology, and material to make nuclear weapons. This leads to my third point and a related fourth point. Strengthening the international norm, not weakening it is what is needed. In that regard, it is disappointing that so much of the debate over the NPT extension conference is over duration rather than strengthening it. My fourth point is that global regimes such as the NPT may not be enough, particularly in unstable regions. The NPT plus regime developed for the Korean Peninsula with its additional ban on plutonium reprocessing facilities and uranium enrichment facilities and its additional bilateral inspection provisions forced North Korea to reveal its hand, but also offers a regime which can help walk the Korean Peninsula back away from the nuclear abyss if we are prepared to insist that parties to the NPT live up to their obligations to all of us.

A second, and inherent, challenge to global arms control regimes is the question of universality. Non-proliferation has come close to being customary international law with the U.N. Security Council declaring at its January 1992 Summit that proliferation is a threat to international security. Nevertheless, we remain a world built upon sovereign states with each having the right to decide if they will join treaties or if they will remain parties.

Global approaches can have the advantage of bringing states within a region to a common position which they might not reach bilaterally or in a regional context. North and South Korea would not have become parties to the NPT

when they did if it had required a bilateral negotiation. Where face to face contact is necessary to address critical disputes, however, this can be a disadvantage. Indian emphasis on universal, global approaches to a number of nuclear issues has had a chilling effect on possible step-by-step approaches with its neighbors and others.

The multiplicity of global regimes dealing with weapons of mass destruction has resulted in a number of nations joining some of the regimes but withholding signature and ratification of others. Often this is caught up in regional security disputes, for example, the decision by a number of Arab states to link their membership in the CWC to Israeli adherence to the NPT. The number of nations not party to the global regimes dealing with weapons of mass destruction is not large, but many are located in and around the Mediterranean region.

Lack of universality need not be a threat to global regimes, but it is likely to become one. Nations party to such agreements will question the merits of membership if other nations, particularly neighbors and potential adversaries, are not subject to comparable restraint. More immediately, nations which have not joined these regimes in order to keep near-term options open may fear pressure will increase on them to join and may act to weaken the regimes in order to keep them at bay. Here I might suggest an approach particularly useful in this region. The international community must recognize that global arms control proposals may not be timely or suitable to the security and foreign policy considerations of particularly nations and regions, but parties to global regimes can demand that nations not actively work to torpedo the regimes the parties have created to enhance their own security and they can expect non-parties to work to address some of the same security threats, such as those posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction by other means or in step-by-step fashion.

A third challenge is that global regimes may be expected to address issues for which they are not appropriate, least suitable, or most inefficient. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) provide a good example. The

debate is old over whether CBMs are required to reduce political tensions or whether a reduction in political tensions are necessary to implement CBMs. The truth is usually a bit of both.

CBMs seem to be at their best when they are helping a political process which is underway between nations experiencing very real difficulties. Global CBMs such as the UN arms registry can be of some value, but they appear shallow, and perhaps sometimes even counterproductive, outside a regional or bilateral context. One can imagine a global open skies regime, but the cost effectiveness of such a regime as it might actually emerge is questionable. Open skies, however, proved useful in the East-West context, and Hungary and Romania found it helpful in a bilateral context. Regional approaches to end the production of unsafeguarded fissile material could be promising in regions such as South Asia, but insistence on only a global approach would block those avenues for progress. Transparency has proven to be an important basis for confidence building, but if not carefully applied, can exacerbate problems, prompting political posturing and arms races.

A fourth challenge to global regimes is that of scope. Over 100 million people have been killed in this century by weapons that are not even advanced conventional munitions, much less weapons of mass destruction. The end of the Cold War and the East West arms control revolution have not prevented the bloodshed in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the like. Indeed, the large weapons frequently used in ethnic fighting in the states of the former Soviet Union are the items excluded from the CFE Treaty as paramilitary equipment. A global convention has been proposed on land-mines because of their residual lethality for innocent civilians long after conflicts are over, but mankind has demonstrated that it will kill with whatever weapons are at its disposal.

This should remind us that controlling arms is but a tool for dealing with more fundamental political and security problems. In short, the scope of global arms control may expand to deal with new categories of weapons, but we must take care that arms control isolated from the basic causes of

conflict can result in the diversion of attention, energy, and resources from the more immediate problems to be addressed. These processes can be complementary, and we should insure that they are.

A fifth challenge to global regimes concerns maintaining the standards necessary to meet real security concerns. I have already described efforts to strengthen the NPT and the BWC and other global regimes, but I have also pointed out that supplemental efforts are necessary in some regions. A number of measures, such as the requirement for full scope safeguards as a condition for the supply of certain nuclear material, have strengthened the non-proliferation regime, but, as I have suggested, an NPT plus regime will be necessary for Iraq and Korea. Even the U.S. and Russia have been evolving bilateral "plus" regimes for both the BWC and the CWC which are themselves global.

Undoubtedly in other regions global regimes will need a "plus" for the nations in those regions to have confidence that their security is being adequately enhanced. The "plus" however cannot be only arms control, and need not be arms control at all. Rather, improvements in the overall political and security equations are more important. Arms control measures played a useful role in bringing about the end of the Cold War, but the Cold War came to an end only because fundamental political changes took place.

One should not get the impression that standards will always be tightened, that ever more detailed restrictions and verification is the inevitable outcome of all future global approaches to arms control and confidence-building. The same strict standards are not necessary under all circumstances, and something of a backlash against further cost and intrusiveness can be detected. On the one hand, a very intrusive verification regime was negotiated for the CWC and greater confidence-building measures including greater openness are being considered for the BWC. On the other hand, nations have greatly resisted greater openness on conventional arms and have shown little interest in intrusive

multilateral inspection of nuclear testing regimes. Indeed, interest in less complex, more general, even declaratory approaches has grown.

During the early days of the Cold War, many people advocated more unilateral, declaratory, and unverifiable measures, some of which did not seem warranted to U.S. policy makers at the time given the geo-strategic situation. Still, several times and especially in the final days of the Cold War, a few such measures were used to reinforce Western diplomacy and security. Parallel unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons provide one example of how fast moving situations may warrant more informal efforts. Reduced alert rates on strategic forces offer another example. This cautious approach to declaratory arms control so characteristic of U.S. arms control strategy during the Cold War has been considered too conservative by some, particularly negotiators in multilateral fora pressing for a strengthening and/or codifying positive and negative security assurances from the nuclear weapons states.

A sixth major challenge to global arms control regimes is dealing with questions of "haves" and the "have nots." What is the viability of global treaties to prohibit the spread of particular weapons if states with those particular weapons keep them and others, outside the regime acquire them. The classic case is the situation under the NPT, but it is not the only case.

In accordance with the NPT, parties which did not already have nuclear weapons prior to the existence of the NPT in joining the NPT are guaranteed access to peaceful nuclear technology. They also receive commitments from the existing nuclear weapons states that they will work toward nuclear disarmament as provided for under Article VI. India, and others, have argued that grandfathering existing capabilities even if not, in theory, permanent is discriminatory. Certainly, the NPT, unlike the CWC, does not provide a precise timeline to equal non-weapons status for all parties.

The five nuclear weapons states provided for under the NPT counter that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is in everyone's interest equally, that the nuclear weapons states have obligations in conjunction with the NPT with respect to the security of non-nuclear weapons states, and that Article VI provides the means whereby the distinction between the nuclear five and other parties can be eliminated and point to INF and the START I and II reductions to demonstrate that process underway. Given that the nuclear weapons states are not likely to go to zero quickly and, further, given that a number of non-nuclear weapons states rely on security guarantees from nuclear weapons states, the discrimination debate among parties has been less about demand for near term denuclearization than about progress on issues such as the CTB, security assurances, and access to technology. The denuclearization issue will, however, receive more attention with the end of the Cold War and the approach of the NPT Extension Conference in 1996.

The more immediate implication of the distinction between "haves" and "have nots" under the NPT is that it is used as a pretext by some nations not to join the regime in order to protect their own options to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons. The prospect that additional states will deploy nuclear weapons poses the most immediate challenge to the NPT. A regime which can survive a lengthy process of removing the nuclear danger may not be able to survive the emergence of new nuclear threats outside the treaty or especially the unraveling of its own membership by either non-compliance or withdrawal. It is not clear that the NPT could even survive the formal creation of a third category of nations for so-called nuclear capable states, perhaps under some form of CTB, if such a regime were to provide legitimization of the pursuit of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapons states.

In this regard, an important non-discriminatory approach to the nuclear disarmament question is the proposal to cut off the production of unsafeguarded fissile material and the development of a step-by-step process under which all states gradually bring their unsafeguarded nuclear material under international control. Typically, this is seen as a global

initiative, and it has an important global dimension. The step-by-step process, however, may actually be promoted more effectively in bilateral and regional or super-regional contexts because nations which are retaining unsafeguarded material do so because of regional security concerns.

The "haves" versus "have nots" debate is not confined to the issue of who has nuclear weapons. The related issue of suppliers and demanders of nuclear and other technologies and material has already been mentioned. Nor is it always the case that the "haves" keep weapons while the "have nots" are denied them. The INF Treaty provides an interesting case. Under the INF Treaty, the US and the former Soviet Union, and indirectly some other nations, gave up the right to two categories of long range missiles currently deployed by other nations. ICBMs, for example, banned to the US and Russia and being eliminated by France are deployed in this region by Saudi Arabia which obtained them from China. Other nations in the developing world seek to acquire such missiles.

What then can we say in summary about the trends and challenges faced by global arms control regimes and related considerations for this region. Global arms control can help the region with its problems, but it cannot solve them. It is not the only, or necessarily the best arms control tool for dealing with complex regional security issues. Indeed, global approaches can become a pretext for inaction within a region, which is unfortunate because global approaches may be too general or too weak to address some serious regional dangers. One should use the tools that work whether they are global, or regional, or unilateral.

Arms control and confidence-building cannot be separated from opportunities and obstacles created by domestic as well as international events. Arms control is not an end in itself, but part of broader approaches to security. Thus, it is important to recognize that the externals may be even more important than the internals of an agreement.

Arms control cannot be divorced from competition, but that does not preclude cooperation. There are prices paid for gains, but arms restraint need not be a zero-sum game. Indeed, some calculation of "win-win" will

be required for agreement. Look for what is ripe and what is necessary to meet immediate priorities. Everything is related to everything, but progress is easier if we avoid rigid and formal linkages. Instead, one should look for packages which meet legitimate security needs.

Global arms control has helped set standards and provide models for achievements. It has provided a foundation of international standards which can help with regional threats. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the emerging international norms will be sustained. It is in everyone's interest that they be continued and strengthened. To do so will require that every nation undertake a step-by-step process, taking into account developments in the security and political spheres to move in the right direction-- away from weapons of mass destruction, away from settlement of disputes by force. There is a real danger that failure to keep the momentum going in the right direction will result in a reversal of direction with the development of momentum toward greater proliferation and conflict. Progress in the future may be more difficult than in the past because we will be dealing with arms control challenges in regions far more complex than many of those faced in the bilateral days of the cold war, or even in issues such as the "haves" and the "have nots."

In short, global negotiating fora can help and in many areas they are the best channel, but they will interfere if their activities become an excuse for inaction by parties in troubled regions. They will hurt also if global initiatives cannot deal with the real issues of a region by having an inappropriate focus or scope, if they undermine higher priorities, or if they dangerously water down standards of confidence needed nations in a region to resolve their disputes peacefully.

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