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Title: Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires States Parties to designate a “competent international authority or authorities” for negotiating and verifying the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programs. Ensuring that such an authority or authorities is able to be fit for purpose when required to meet these tasks will be crucial for both the future implementation and legitimacy of the Treaty. To address this challenge, this article proposes the early creation of a two-part organizational structure, comprising an implementation support unit and a dedicated scientific and technical advisory body, to begin the process of institutionalizing the treaty, and build the technical basis for meeting its verification goals should a nuclear-weapon-possessing state decide to join. The article then discusses how such two-part structure could be scaled-up as a standing international organization tasked with the coordination of an ad hoc inspectorate, which would also cooperate and complement the work of existing nuclear verification organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. This evolutionary and adaptive strategy to institution building could empower the new Treaty by supporting the emergence of a new regime complex for nuclear disarmament, while taking into account the initially limited financial and technical resources of its member states.

Authors:
ORCiD logo [1]; ORCiD logo [2]; ORCiD logo [1]
  1. Princeton Univ., NJ (United States)
  2. Princeton Univ., NJ (United States); Harvard Univ., Cambridge, MA (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (NA-22)
OSTI Identifier:
1798843
Grant/Contract Number:  
NA0002534
Resource Type:
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 2; Journal Issue: 2; Journal ID: ISSN 2575-1654
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; nuclear weapons; prohibition; verification; international organization

Citation Formats

Patton, Tamara, Philippe, Sébastien, and Mian, Zia. Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. United States: N. p., 2019. Web. doi:10.1080/25751654.2019.1666699.
Patton, Tamara, Philippe, Sébastien, & Mian, Zia. Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. United States. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1666699
Patton, Tamara, Philippe, Sébastien, and Mian, Zia. Tue . "Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons". United States. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1666699. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1798843.
@article{osti_1798843,
title = {Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons},
author = {Patton, Tamara and Philippe, Sébastien and Mian, Zia},
abstractNote = {The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires States Parties to designate a “competent international authority or authorities” for negotiating and verifying the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programs. Ensuring that such an authority or authorities is able to be fit for purpose when required to meet these tasks will be crucial for both the future implementation and legitimacy of the Treaty. To address this challenge, this article proposes the early creation of a two-part organizational structure, comprising an implementation support unit and a dedicated scientific and technical advisory body, to begin the process of institutionalizing the treaty, and build the technical basis for meeting its verification goals should a nuclear-weapon-possessing state decide to join. The article then discusses how such two-part structure could be scaled-up as a standing international organization tasked with the coordination of an ad hoc inspectorate, which would also cooperate and complement the work of existing nuclear verification organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. This evolutionary and adaptive strategy to institution building could empower the new Treaty by supporting the emergence of a new regime complex for nuclear disarmament, while taking into account the initially limited financial and technical resources of its member states.},
doi = {10.1080/25751654.2019.1666699},
journal = {Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament},
number = 2,
volume = 2,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Sep 24 00:00:00 EDT 2019},
month = {Tue Sep 24 00:00:00 EDT 2019}
}

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