Resilience Analysis of DC Microgrids under Denial of Service Threats

Liu, Jianzhe; Lu, Xiaonan; Wang, Jianhui

doi:10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2897499

Title: Resilience Analysis of DC Microgrids under Denial of Service Threats

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Abstract

This paper develops a resilience analysis framework to study the fault ride-through capability of direct current (DC) microgrids in unknown denial of service (DoS) cyber incidents. DoS can be a frequent threat to DC microgrids with advanced controllers that hinge on active information exchanges: it can paralyze data communications and cause control ineptness or even system instability. Furthermore, we show that temporal DoS incidents render the DC microgrid cyber-physical topology and parameters time-varying and cause them to jump between faulty conditions. As existing DC microgrid stability analysis results are primarily developed from time-invariant systems, they might not be valid for the DoS interrupted systems. In this paper, we seek to study whether a DC microgrid is resilient against time-varying unknown DoS incidents. The problem is formulated as a stability analysis problem for a system with randomly switching dynamics. Scalable conditions are developed to provide provable resilience guarantees. In addition, we exploit the special structure of the conditions to yield quantified resilience measure by convex optimization techniques. As a result, the measure can be used for the evaluation of the resilience of different DC microgrid design against DoS incidents. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed work using simulation case studies.

Authors:

Liu, Jianzhe ^[1]; Lu, Xiaonan ^[2]; Wang, Jianhui ^[3]

Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Lemont, IL (United States)
Temple Univ., Philadelphia, PA (United States)
Southern Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX (United States)

Publication Date:: Mon Feb 04 00:00:00 EST 2019

Research Org.:: Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE Office of Electricity (OE)

OSTI Identifier:: 1518477

Grant/Contract Number:: AC02-06CH11357

Resource Type:: Accepted Manuscript

Journal Name:: IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

Additional Journal Information:: Journal Volume: 34; Journal Issue: 4; Journal ID: ISSN 0885-8950

Publisher:: IEEE

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION; DC microgrid; Switched system; denial of service; stability analysis; cyber physical systems; resilience

Citation Formats


                    Liu, Jianzhe, Lu, Xiaonan, and Wang, Jianhui. Resilience Analysis of DC Microgrids under Denial of Service Threats.  United States: N. p., 2019. 
Web.  doi:10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2897499.

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                    Liu, Jianzhe, Lu, Xiaonan, & Wang, Jianhui. Resilience Analysis of DC Microgrids under Denial of Service Threats.  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2897499

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                    Liu, Jianzhe, Lu, Xiaonan, and Wang, Jianhui. Mon .  
"Resilience Analysis of DC Microgrids under Denial of Service Threats".  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2897499.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1518477.

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@article{osti_1518477,

  title        = {Resilience Analysis of DC Microgrids under Denial of Service Threats},

  author       = {Liu, Jianzhe and Lu, Xiaonan and Wang, Jianhui},

  abstractNote = {This paper develops a resilience analysis framework to study the fault ride-through capability of direct current (DC) microgrids in unknown denial of service (DoS) cyber incidents. DoS can be a frequent threat to DC microgrids with advanced controllers that hinge on active information exchanges: it can paralyze data communications and cause control ineptness or even system instability. Furthermore, we show that temporal DoS incidents render the DC microgrid cyber-physical topology and parameters time-varying and cause them to jump between faulty conditions. As existing DC microgrid stability analysis results are primarily developed from time-invariant systems, they might not be valid for the DoS interrupted systems. In this paper, we seek to study whether a DC microgrid is resilient against time-varying unknown DoS incidents. The problem is formulated as a stability analysis problem for a system with randomly switching dynamics. Scalable conditions are developed to provide provable resilience guarantees. In addition, we exploit the special structure of the conditions to yield quantified resilience measure by convex optimization techniques. As a result, the measure can be used for the evaluation of the resilience of different DC microgrid design against DoS incidents. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed work using simulation case studies.},

  doi          = {10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2897499},

  journal      = {IEEE Transactions on Power Systems},

  number       = 4,

  volume       = 34,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {Mon Feb 04 00:00:00 EST 2019},

  month        = {Mon Feb 04 00:00:00 EST 2019}

}

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