Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification

Schoeppner, Michael; Glaser, Alexander

doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2016.06.001

Title: Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification

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Abstract

Burnup calculations are applied to determine the amount of krypton-85 that is produced during the irradiation of nuclear fuel. Since krypton-85 is most likely released into the atmosphere during reprocessing to separate plutonium, atmospheric transport modeling is used to calculate the worldwide distribution of krypton-85 concentrations stemming from emissions from declared reprocessing plants. Our results are the basis for scenarios in which emissions from clandestine reprocessing facilities have to be detected against various background levels. We conclude that today’s background imposes heavily on the ability to detect small and medium plutonium separation rates; only high separation rates of 1 SQ per week and higher have a chance to be detected with feasible outlay. A fixed network of monitoring stations seems too costly; instead the high number of samples that are required rather calls for mobile sampling procedures, where air samples are collected at random locations over the world and are analyzed in regional laboratories for their krypton-85 concentration. Furthermore, it is argued that krypton-85 emissions from declared reprocessing activities have to be significantly lowered to enable a worldwide verification of the absence of even smaller clandestine reprocessing. For each scenario the number of samples that have to be taken formore » probable detection is calculated.« less

Authors:

Schoeppner, Michael ^[1]; Glaser, Alexander ^[1]

Princeton Univ., NJ (United States). Program on Science and Global Security

Publication Date:: Fri Jun 17 00:00:00 EDT 2016

Research Org.:: Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

OSTI Identifier:: 1367877

Grant/Contract Number:: NA0002534

Resource Type:: Accepted Manuscript

Journal Name:: Journal of Environmental Radioactivity

Additional Journal Information:: Journal Volume: 162-163; Journal Issue: C; Journal ID: ISSN 0265-931X

Publisher:: Elsevier

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; Atmospheric transport; Fissile material; Plutonium; Noble gas emissions; Environmental tracer

Citation Formats


                    Schoeppner, Michael, and Glaser, Alexander. Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification.  United States: N. p., 2016. 
Web.  doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2016.06.001.

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                    Schoeppner, Michael, & Glaser, Alexander. Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification.  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvrad.2016.06.001

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                    Schoeppner, Michael, and Glaser, Alexander. Fri .  
"Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification".  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvrad.2016.06.001.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1367877.

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@article{osti_1367877,

  title        = {Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification},

  author       = {Schoeppner, Michael and Glaser, Alexander},

  abstractNote = {Burnup calculations are applied to determine the amount of krypton-85 that is produced during the irradiation of nuclear fuel. Since krypton-85 is most likely released into the atmosphere during reprocessing to separate plutonium, atmospheric transport modeling is used to calculate the worldwide distribution of krypton-85 concentrations stemming from emissions from declared reprocessing plants. Our results are the basis for scenarios in which emissions from clandestine reprocessing facilities have to be detected against various background levels. We conclude that today’s background imposes heavily on the ability to detect small and medium plutonium separation rates; only high separation rates of 1 SQ per week and higher have a chance to be detected with feasible outlay. A fixed network of monitoring stations seems too costly; instead the high number of samples that are required rather calls for mobile sampling procedures, where air samples are collected at random locations over the world and are analyzed in regional laboratories for their krypton-85 concentration. Furthermore, it is argued that krypton-85 emissions from declared reprocessing activities have to be significantly lowered to enable a worldwide verification of the absence of even smaller clandestine reprocessing. For each scenario the number of samples that have to be taken for probable detection is calculated.},

  doi          = {10.1016/j.jenvrad.2016.06.001},

  journal      = {Journal of Environmental Radioactivity},

  number       = C,

  volume       = 162-163,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {Fri Jun 17 00:00:00 EDT 2016},

  month        = {Fri Jun 17 00:00:00 EDT 2016}

}

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