VARIATION OF STRIKE INCENTIVES WITH DAMAGE PREFERENCES
For START III level forces, strike allocations and magnitudes vary little with L, but first strike costs vary directly with L, which means that for K reflecting a preference for the survival of high value targets over their destruction and a preference for high value over military targets, the costs of action are far greater than those of inaction for a wide range of values of damage preference L. Thus, if both sides have much greater preferences for the survival of their high value targets than for military targets or destruction, they do not see a net incentive to strike, and crises are terminated by inaction. Recent decades suggest strong preferences for the survival of high value and that this has contributed to the lack of direct conflict during that period.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab., NM (US)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- US Department of Energy (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 784480
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-01-4597
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
COST OF ADDRESSING TARGETS OF UNEQUAL VALUE
Optimization of stability index versus first strike cost