COST OF ADDRESSING TARGETS OF UNEQUAL VALUE
The formalism for evaluating first strike costs and incentives for military targeting generalize to include higher value targets. That introduces two new allocations to the usual allocation between missiles and military targets, but they can be performed analytically. As the number of weapons on each side decreases, the optimal fraction of second strike weapons allocated to military values falls. The shift to high value targets is more pronounced below about 1,000 weapons for nominal parameters. Below 500 weapons the first striker's cost of action drops below its cost of inaction. A strike would induce a second strike of about 250 weapons on high value targets. An increase in the first striker's preference for damage to the other's high value targets increases or a decrease in its preference for preventing damage to its own high value targets decreases first strike costs and stability margins. Including defenses complicates allocations slightly. The main effect is increased attrition of second strikes, particularly at larger defenses, which makes it possible to significantly reduce damage to high value targets. At 1,000 weapons, by 300 to 400 interceptors the first striker's costs are reduced to 30% below that of inaction and the number of weapons delivered on the first striker's high value targets is reduced to about 100.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab., NM (US)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- US Department of Energy (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 784487
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-01-4561
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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