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Title: Chernobyl lessons learned review of N Reactor

Abstract

A broad-base review of the N Reactor plant, design characteristics, administrative controls and responses unique to upset conditions has been completed. The review was keyed to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-defined issues associated with the Chernobyl accident. Physical features of N Reactor that preclude an accident like Chernobyl include: lack of autocatalytic reactivity insertion (i.e., negative coolant void and power coefficents) and two separate, fast-acting scram systems. Administrative controls in place at N Reactor would effectively protect against the operator errors and safety violations that set up the Chernobyl accident. Several items were identified where further near-term action is appropriate to ensure effectiveness of existing safety features: Resolve a question concerning the exact point at which Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) activation by manual actions should be implemented or deferred if automatic ECCS trip fails. Ensure appropriate revision of the Emergency Response Guides and full communication of the correct procedure to all Operations, Safety and cognizant Technology staff. Train reactor operators in the currently recognized significance of the Graphite and Shield Cooling System (GSCS) in severe accident situations and cover this appropriately in the Emergency Response Guides. Complete reviews which establish an independent verification that pressure tube rupture will not propagatemore » to other tubes. 15 refs., 3 tabs.« less

Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
719193
Report Number(s):
WHC-SP-0257
ON: TI88012086
DOE Contract Number:  
AC06-87RL10930
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: Oct 1987
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS; N-REACTOR; REACTOR SAFETY; CHERNOBYLSK-4 REACTOR; DESIGN; EMERGENCY PLANS; ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS; HEAT TRANSFER; HYDRAULICS; REACTOR ACCIDENTS; REACTOR COOLING SYSTEMS; REACTOR MONITORING SYSTEMS; REACTOR OPERATION; SCRAM

Citation Formats

Weber, E T, McNeece, J P, Omberg, R P, Stepnewski, D D, Lutz, R J, Henry, R E, Bonser, K D, and Miller, N R. Chernobyl lessons learned review of N Reactor. United States: N. p., 1987. Web. doi:10.2172/719193.
Weber, E T, McNeece, J P, Omberg, R P, Stepnewski, D D, Lutz, R J, Henry, R E, Bonser, K D, & Miller, N R. Chernobyl lessons learned review of N Reactor. United States. doi:10.2172/719193.
Weber, E T, McNeece, J P, Omberg, R P, Stepnewski, D D, Lutz, R J, Henry, R E, Bonser, K D, and Miller, N R. Thu . "Chernobyl lessons learned review of N Reactor". United States. doi:10.2172/719193. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/719193.
@article{osti_719193,
title = {Chernobyl lessons learned review of N Reactor},
author = {Weber, E T and McNeece, J P and Omberg, R P and Stepnewski, D D and Lutz, R J and Henry, R E and Bonser, K D and Miller, N R},
abstractNote = {A broad-base review of the N Reactor plant, design characteristics, administrative controls and responses unique to upset conditions has been completed. The review was keyed to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-defined issues associated with the Chernobyl accident. Physical features of N Reactor that preclude an accident like Chernobyl include: lack of autocatalytic reactivity insertion (i.e., negative coolant void and power coefficents) and two separate, fast-acting scram systems. Administrative controls in place at N Reactor would effectively protect against the operator errors and safety violations that set up the Chernobyl accident. Several items were identified where further near-term action is appropriate to ensure effectiveness of existing safety features: Resolve a question concerning the exact point at which Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) activation by manual actions should be implemented or deferred if automatic ECCS trip fails. Ensure appropriate revision of the Emergency Response Guides and full communication of the correct procedure to all Operations, Safety and cognizant Technology staff. Train reactor operators in the currently recognized significance of the Graphite and Shield Cooling System (GSCS) in severe accident situations and cover this appropriately in the Emergency Response Guides. Complete reviews which establish an independent verification that pressure tube rupture will not propagate to other tubes. 15 refs., 3 tabs.},
doi = {10.2172/719193},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {1987},
month = {10}
}