Potential Soviet compromise on ballistic missile defense. Final report

Technical Report · Wed Nov 01 04:00:00 EST 1989

OSTI ID:6951190

Nguyen, H P

The body of this research memorandum was written before the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming. It presented evidence suggesting that the Soviet Union might agree to a compromise at the Wyoming meeting that defers the issue of ballistic missile defense (BMD) negotiations to a later stage in arms reductions, thus facilitating a first-stage cut in offensive arms without an explicit Soviet endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Through this compromise, offensive arms reductions should first be delinked from an agreement on BMD, and then be relinked during the second stage of deeper cuts. Therefore, negotiations on limiting BMD systems, though deterred, are deemed inevitable if the U.S. persists in deploying a strategic defense system (SDS). Moreover, some Soviet arms controllers already look beyond the first stage to the prospect of negotiated transition into a strategic defense environment (i.e., a reliance on defensive deterrence). In this approach, Wyoming, then, was expected to be only a first move in the Soviet negotiating strategy for a grand compromise on strategic defense. As explained in the afterword added to the paper, the actual events at Wyoming seem consistent with that interpretation.

• Research Organization: Office of the Chief of Naval Research, Arlington, VA (USA)
• OSTI ID: 6951190
• Report Number(s): AD-A-218924/9/XAB; CRM--89-288
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

350100* -- Arms Control-- Policy
Negotiations
& Legislation-- (1987-)
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
ASIA
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
DECISION MAKING
DOCUMENT TYPES
EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPE
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MILITARY STRATEGY
NATIONAL DEFENSE
POLITICAL ASPECTS
PROGRESS REPORT
TREATIES
USSR
WEAPONS