Design lessons from using programmable controllers in the MFTF-B personnel safety and interlocks system
Applying programmable controllers in critical applications such as personnel safety and interlocks systems requires special considerations in the design of both hardware and software. All modern programmable controller systems feature extensive internal diagnostic capabilities to protect against problems such as program memory errors; however most, if not all present designs lack an intrinsic capability for detecting and countering failures on the field-side of their I/O modules. Many of the most common styles of I/O modules can also introduce potentially dangerous sneak circuits, even without component failure. This paper presents the most significant lessons learned to date in the design of the MFTF-B Personnel Safety and Interlocks System, which utilizes two non-redundant programmable controllers with over 800 I/O points each. Specific problems recognized during the design process as well as those discovered during initial testing and operation are discussed along with their specific solutions in hardware and software.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 6935223
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-89206; CONF-831203-148; ON: DE84012596
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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