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Criticality safety comparisons of spent fuel facility concepts

Technical Report ·
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/6825015· OSTI ID:6825015
Seven storage concepts were analyzed from the viewpoint of nuclear criticality safety. All concepts, with the exception of the water basin, were assumed to use the same canister type. This 13-in. ID cylinder contains one PWR assembly (Westinghouse 17 x 17) which is composed of fresh UO/sub 2/ fuel enriched at 3.5 wt % /sup 235/U. Canister failure and water intrusion were allowed. Consideration was also given to fuel rod disintegration due to UO/sub 2/ oxidation. For the case of intact fuel rods, the single canister concepts are preferred from the viewpoint of criticality safety. The SSCC-1 (Sealed Storage Cask Concepts-1) would be the best choice followed by the SSCC-RSSF, and next the Drywell. For the multiple canister concepts the order of preference is DWSC-2 (Drywell with Supplemental Cooling), SSCC-2, and ACVC (Air Cooled Vault Concept). For intact fuel rods all concepts are potentially licensable; however, the SSCC-2 and ACVC may be questionable. The disintegration of fuel rods poses a safety problem for all concepts. While one concept could be more reactive than another, the difference is small. As described none of the concepts would be acceptable unless disintegration is shown to be incredible, or water intrusion is shown to be incredible. Canister redesign and/or less restrictive assumptions (allowing credit for burnup for instance) might yield a safe design even if the two items above cannot be met.
Research Organization:
Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs., Richland, WA (USA)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)
DOE Contract Number:
EY-76-C-06-1830
OSTI ID:
6825015
Report Number(s):
PNL-2590
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English